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How to Hear the Unspoken: Engaging Cross-Cultural Communication Through the Latin
American Testimonial Narrative
Elena Flores Ruiz-Aho
ABSTRACT
This project seeks to address issues in cultural politics brought on by difficulties
in cross-cultural communication, particularly as these problems manifest themselves in
twentieth century Latin American testimonial narratives. By developing a critical line of
questioning drawn from Gayatri Spivak’s influential article “Can the Subaltern Speak,”
one aim herein is to analyze and describe the ways in which the narrative, Me Llamo
Rigoberta Menchú y Así Me Nació la Conciencia, translated into English as I, Rigoberta
Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, exemplifies the incommensurable nature of
cross-cultural discursive attempts. This is done through a twofold method: one, by
placing heavy emphasis on the role of the reader as constitutor of meaning in a (textual)
discursive transaction between culturally-different agents, and two, by drawing attention
to the role of historically-determined interpretive frameworks in the reception and
interpretation of Subaltern ennunciative acts. The latter, I argue, is necessary for gaining
an adequate understanding of receiving and conveying meaning within cross-cultural
paradigms. To this end, as an example of the problems, contextual and methodological,
that arise in such communicative attempts between cultures, I take up the academic
controversy stirred up by the publication of David Stoll’s Rigoberta Menchú and the
Story of All Poor Guatemalans. Lastly, I investigate the socio-political implications of
such failures in intercultural communication, giving rise to secondary lines of questioning
such as finding ways to create favorable conditions for the possibility of genuine crosscultural dialogue. One possibility, I suggest, is adopting a method of reading/listening
which, borrowing from phenomenology, is continually on the way, always unfinished,
and lets the life of the subaltern emerge by remaining open, not just to what is said, but to
what is left unsaid.
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INTRODUCTION

The question at the heart of this thesis is this: If, as the postcolonial critic Gayatri
Spivak has proposed, the rejoinder to the question “can the subaltern1 speak,” is no—
because if she2 could speak in a way that mattered to us she would cease to be
subaltern—then how can we, as readers of subaltern texts, ever hope to hear what the
Other is saying? In other words, how can we understand subaltern speaking practices as
they are expressed from the point of subalternity without necessarily having to decode
such practices through our own conceptual orthodoxies (and in so doing, distort the
message in our own image)? For what will be taken as having been ‘understood’ then, to
be sure, will bear far more resemblance to the worldview of the listener than to the
speaker or, for our purposes, to the Western reader than the subaltern narrator. To this
end, if the meaning of subaltern discursive acts cannot be heard as such, but are always
refracted through the lens of the interlocutor’s culture (often in disproportionate ways),
how is equitable dialogue between cultures possible? This is the all-embracing
predicament of my research.
Instead of a fixed answer, I propose that the first step towards a continual,
regenerative understanding of the question of cross cultural commensurability lies in
grasping the very inescapability of our own interpretive frameworks, or what Heidegger
refers to as “our hermeneutic situation.”3 In short, the way we engage other worlds, in an
effort to understand them, is at all times colored by how we already make sense of our
own world. Where ‘world’ is seen as the socio-historical background that we grow into,
we pre-reflectively graft this background or sense of intelligibility onto the cultures we
seek to understand, despite points of incompatibility or incongruity. This interpretive
reflex, in turn, has far reaching social and, more importantly, political ramifications
insofar as it precludes the possibility of “genuine” dialogue between cultures, especially
when it is deployed by Western cultures in the form of what Weber calls “instrumental
rationality.”4
However, in disposing with the fiction that a detached, completely “neutral”
position exists which can yield something like controlled “objective knowledge,” one
curative reply to cross-cultural incommensurability is to simply let be; to become aware
of our hermeneutic prejudices, from which we cannot escape, and to open ourselves up,
as readers, to a kind of receptivity which requires paying very careful attention not to
what the narrator is saying (for as subaltern, it is incommensurable) but to what she
cannot be heard as saying because our ears do not yet know how to reach for this
‘silence’. In short, we must learn to hear for the differences that make a difference (as in
divergent historical traditions), grapple with the anxiety this loss of meaning provokes—
an anxiety that emerges when we don’t ‘know’ what is going on – and reconnect the
1

nexus of relations lost through instrumental encounters with texts. We may do this, as
the title suggests, by hearing carefully for the unsaid that is at all times nested in the Said:
for the circumstantial patterns of the social fabric which let meaning emerge in culturally
distinctive ways. Thus, in order to hear how it is the Other relates to herself,
it becomes necessary to point to those narrative descriptions of everyday phenomena
indicative of the subaltern’s way of life. In so doing, we can begin to familiarize
ourselves with the color, texture, and length of the threads used to weave narrative
tapestries together; tapestries that express how social and historical patterns are entwined
into a cohesive ‘life story’ one already makes sense of.
Broadly speaking, then, this thesis takes up issues in cultural politics brought on
by problems in communication, specifically between cultures stratified by the Colonial
encounter (as in the creation of economically maldeveloped ‘Third’ and modernized
‘First’ worlds). It was forged, not as a response to, but as an applied effort to provide a
concrete example of what Spivak meant in her landmark essay “Can the Subaltern
Speak?”5 Yet Spivak’s provocative response – that no, the Subaltern cannot speak— is
often misunderstood, even by her own account6, by many critics to suggest political
paralysis rather than a deepening of the question of subaltern agency and communication.
It is easily misinterpreted, in part, because it is grounded on a difficult, even more
primordial question of how intelligibility is possible in the first place. In other words,
what makes it possible (or shows up as a barrier to the possibility) for the subaltern
subject to speak is predicated on what makes it possible for the ennunciative acts of any
human to effectively count as speaking, where speaking is seen as the ability to convey
and receive meaning.
The problem comes when subaltern subjects, under conditions of historical
duress, attempt to speak to other cultures in an effort to preserve life. As Spivak has
shown, it is often “the inaccessibility of, or untranslatability from, one mode of discourse
in a dispute to another,” 7 that results in points of intelligibility— nodes in the linguistic
exchange that supplant meaning-full dialogue between cultures. This, in turn, opens up
the possibility for delegitimizing subaltern speech acts; of reterritorializing their
discourse on the basis of master modes of discourse such as “neutral”, objective reason.
Rather than point to the destabilizing effects produced by foreign ways of understanding,
the Western interlocutor in particular8, hears by ‘picking out’ and ‘listening for’ narrative
inconsistencies in terms of departures from his own understanding, where his perspective
is placed as a centrifuge that separates out vocal matter of different densities—that is,
different from his own. Thus, the Western interlocutor often responds to the subversion
of his own ways of understanding with yet another life instinct-- by imposing his own
networks of signification as if they were universal truths. As Walter Benjamin has put it,
“truth seems to stand in the way of truth, or more exactly, truth and transmission get in
each other’s way.” 9
Thus, to approach the question of subaltern discursive practices, or the possibility
of the effective existence of such practices, I am simultaneously concerned with the
production and reception of meaning as fashioned by culturally-different agents. In other
words, I ask, by virtue of what cultural and historical conventions do we register and
2

convey expressions so that they make sense to us, materializing in the ways one is used
to hearing them appear as intelligible? Moreover, the pre-reflective social activities of
conveying and receiving meaning also imply the existence of a shared medium through
which these actions can take place between speakers and through which a shared
intelligibility is made possible: language. Meaning is conveyed though a language
which both transmits meaning and constitutes it, thereby making communication
possible. With the emphasis on articulating how intelligibility becomes possible, then, I
draw from continental philosophy, and especially—but not solely—on Heidegger’s
account of intelligibility throughout various points in the thesis.
But to recall the subject matter at hand, it is subaltern speaking practices that are
of present interest, not interpersonal communication. Thus far, what is being described
(and needs to be described first) is how communication is made possible intraculturally, a
task briefly undertaken within the thesis’ first chapter, entitled Cross-Cultural
Communication and the Principle of Incommensurability.10 The title emphasizes the
“cross” cultural aspects of communication for the following reason: because the state of
Subalternity— seen by Ranajit Guha as a “general name for the attribute of
subordination”11— is created through the maintenance of subordinating conditions
throughout the postcolonial world, Subalternity is in my view a comparative term
between culturally dominant and inferior cultures, where the subaltern are
asymmetrically positioned12 in the latter role. For this reason, I establish the parameters
of the overall discussion strictly within the scope of cross-cultural communication, and,
more specifically, as it is manifested in subaltern texts; that is, those narrative practices
which have been codified into a system of written representation for the purposes of
communicating situations of bondage, oppression, or as oppositional supplements to
Official colonial representations of subaltern history.
For example, one of the most, if not the most, well-known example of subaltern
texts to come from Latin America— and also the one taken up throughout this thesis as
an exemplar of Spivak’s problematic— is Me Llamo Rigoberta Menchú y Así Me Nació
la Conciencia, translated into English as I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in
Guatemala. Edited and complied by the Venezuelan ethnographer Elizabeth BurgosDebray, it is the late twentieth-century “testimonial” narrative of Rigoberta Menchú, a
Quiché Mayan Indian woman who faces persecution, repression and discrimination by
virtue of her peripheral position in history. As an indigenous peasant living in a
postcolonial territory ravaged by racism against Indians, Menchú can easily be seen as a
Subaltern since her situation of enunciation is tied to a historical lack of access to official
systems of representation.
Told extemporaneously to Burgos-Debray in several tape-recorded sessions
beginning in January of 1982, Menchú describes the brutalizing repression of her
indigenous community, including the murder of her family, at the hands of a U.S. backed
(and for which former president Clinton has publicly apologized13) national government;
a repression so widespread and totalizing that the United Nations termed it a “holocaust”
in its official human rights report, “Guatemala: Never Again”14— a report whose author,
Bishop Gerardi, was assassinated only forty-eight hours after delivering it.15
3

Insofar as the oral narrator of Me Llamo Rigoberta Menchú, y Así Me Nació la
Conciencia is interpreted as actively denouncing, objecting and decrying a specific
situation and taking a concrete stand against it, it is a text of protest, one that seemed to
have achieved its goals of effecting change by “helping to bring about the signing of the
peace accords” which ended the violence against her community16. Because of this, by
the early nineties, it appeared as if despite being a subaltern voice Menchú was actually
being heard, taken seriously, and recognized accordingly; in 1992, on the 500th
anniversary of the Conquest, Menchú was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work
and activism for indigenous rights.
Coming at a time when multiculturalism and the debates over identity politics
were transforming the landscapes of the North American academy, approbating cheers
and applauses from many of its leading “tenured radicals” followed the broadcasting of
the Peace Prize winner. The excitement generated by Menchú’s award soon materialized
into a cottage industry of essays, books, conferences, special topic journals and doctoral
dissertations over the nature of subaltern narratives, testimonial practice and the insurgent
qualities testimonial texts of protest seemed to be capable of producing to effect change.
Menchú’s narrative caught on as a concrete example of the ways subaltern subjects can
engage in the project of decolonization by— as Edward Said called it in his landmark
book, Orientalism – “unthinking Eurocentrism”17. As an oral narrative dictated to a
professional interlocutor, typically a western ethnographer, Testimonio seemed to be able
to bypass many of the literary conventions of humanist writing, namely, those of the
bourgeois autobiographic novel and its dependence on the Enlightenment conception of
the ‘Self’, of the mentalistic “I” that narrates a life story.
Furthermore, the interpretive response to Menchú’s narrative was coming from a
rather interdisciplinary consortium: Comparative Literature, Cultural Studies, Political
Science, Anthropology, History, and not to mention heavy activity in Foreign Language
Departments was taking place. Despite the existence of very real and, at times, heated
contentions over the “essential nature” and “proper literary genre” Testimonio should
belong to, what emerged as the adopted gold standard for interpreting Testimonio became
the socio-political theorist John Beverley’s account of Testimonio as “the powerful
affirmation of the [subaltern] speaking subject”18. Beverley had as his example, at the
time he first theorized Testimonio, the revolutionary victory of the Sandinistas in the
Nicaraguan Revolution and their aesthetic experiments in the ‘democratization of
culture’. It was the Nicaraguan and Cuban Revolutions, moreover, which proliferated the
use of Testimonio as an insurgent cultural apparatus. In fact, by the late eighties the need
to critically rethink the genre had waned due to its popular integration into postrevolutionary discourse and practice; in Nicaragua, for example, the period of socialdemocratic consolidation following the 1979 revolution saw Testimonio as a valuable
populist tool for talking about one’s revolutionary experiences. By 1996, with the
Guatemalan war over, Menchú a celebrated human and indigenous rights activist, and a
new topic called “Testimonial Literature” to act as academic cannon fodder for years to
come, the pedagogic need to reexamine Testimonio was held in abeyance19 … and so the
cellar door closed.
4

Had what happened next not occurred, or at least come to my attention, perhaps
this thesis might never have been written: the scandalous claim by an American
anthropologist that “Rigoberta lied” and, owing to this accusation, the subsequent
denouncement of Menchú in the front page of the New York Times as a “Tarnished
Laureate”. In Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans, David Stoll
argues that Menchú’s “autobiography” is a series of “fabrications”, “lies”, and “mythic
inflations” manipulated to look like ‘facts’ in order to serve the interests of the
revolutionary vanguard organization she worked for. Although almost a quarter of a
million Guatemalan Indians were incontrovertibly murdered, tortured, widowed or
orphaned by the military repression, what is at stake for Stoll is his ability to have reliable
indigenous informants, ones that stick to neutral ‘facts’ so that he, the “objective
interpreter” can do his job of interpreting their own situation back to them.
In chapter two, called Letting Context Be: History and the Rigoberta Menchú
Controversy, I critique the reception of Menchú’s narrative by Stoll through a threefold
argument. First, I present Stoll’s reading of Menchú as an example of how reading texts
outside a historical context enables detached, instrumental encounters with texts;
moreover, I address this tension by providing an in depth, though fundamentally limited
description of the historical framework out of which Menchú’s narrative emerges.
Secondly, in detailing the semantics of the “controversy” (which is done in chapter three,
To Bear Truthful Witness: David Stoll and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans), I
illustrate how in monopolizing the conditions for credibility (such as being a “reliable”
witness capable of presenting corroborative empirical ‘proof’ of her statements, which
must never be contradictory) Stoll co-opts the means of the discursive exchange through
which marginalized peoples can have their testimonies taken seriously; he does this by
pre-reflectively grounding his own discourse within the framework of a naturalistic
ontology. As a consequence, Stoll deploys what Ranajit Guha has termed “the prose of
counter-insurgency”20 as a symptom of the naturalistic prejudices that devalue sociohistorical contexts and culturally normative practices in favor of a positivist view of
knowledge.
Thirdly, what I wish to highlight in this chapter is this: in ‘deconstructing’
Menchú’s narrative, what is not often purveyed in the various academic interpretations of
the text (especially by Stoll) is that it is also a painstakingly descriptive account of daily
Quiché life, customs, habits and rituals. They are practices and routines which at times
sound so ‘irrelevant’ to the often preconceived “political aim” of the text, or are dissonant
to our own way of life, that the tendency to skim over their significance by thinking of
them as ‘exotic’ particularities or foreign names arises in our reading practices. The
book’s compiler herself notes:
“I initially gave [Menchú] a schematic outline, a chronology: childhood,
adolescence, family, involvement in the struggle…As we continued, Rigoberta made
more and more digressions, introduced descriptions of cultural practices into her story
and generally upset my chronology…the chapters describing ceremonies relating to birth,
marriage and harvests did cause some problems, as I somehow had to integrate them into
the narrative”.21
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Yet Menchú’s narrative descriptions of ceremonial life constitute more than what
is said or, more importantly, what the reader recognizes as having been said— as
chronological digressions of “picturesque” cultural quotidian unconnected with the
human rights denouncement of the Guatemalan military and U.S. government. And yet
these descriptions of daily life and ceremonial customs in fact point to something more
subterranean in postcolonial narratives of protest, something else that does not appear in
surface readings as Said: the legacy of colonialism as an ever-present understanding. It is
there, between the lines, in the oral devices and the indomitable insistence on talking
about everyday practices—because for Menchú that is the “I” that is speaking— that one
can hear the silences which are always attempting to reach the articulated level of the
said, but without an ear for it, fall back into the gaps of the text. These gaps, in turn, are
created by the very event of reading a culturally-different text; without shared histories or
position in history, at the moment of reading/listening to the Other we transcode their
speech acts by treating it as a mirror to ourselves. Thus, Menchú points to these practices
to orient the reader beyond these gaps and towards what she wishes to say since these
practices are what orient her own life; to understand her words is thus to already be at
home with her world. And because Stoll and well-meaning North American academics
alike are historically positioned in advance in a world with different practices and habits,
the world that gets articulated in their critiques and defenses of Menchú is always nother-world; the subaltern cannot speak as herself. To speak, she must become…like us.
In light of this quagmire, by attentively pointing to these descriptions of daily life
and oral conventions (such as repetition) in the narrative, I attempt to shift focus away
from the runaway train that has become the Stoll-Menchú controversy in academic
circles, perhaps most poignantly seen in recent book-length treatments solely focused on
the “controversy”22. Staying close to the text will help clarify and situate many of the
arguments about “authorship,” “Truth,” “speaking for others,” and “reliability of
witnesses” central to the controversy. Furthermore, if these everyday descriptions (such
as telling and retelling what she has for breakfast, what she eats for dinner) seem “out of
place” in Menchú’s narrative it is because our own practices of reading have become
conventionalized, organized according to an understanding of ‘text’ and ‘narrative’ where
the “story” begins in the first page and ends in the last, without continuation in the social
matrix that originally gave rise to it. But all narratives, to recall, are made possible in
virtue of the history from which they arise. On this view all autobiography is essentially a
social autobiography, a perspectival narrative grounded on historical frameworks of
reference.
Moreover, it is important to note that before the controversy, virtually no
philosophical engagement of testimonio existed23 because, for the most part, no one saw a
need for it. Because we tend to pay attention to what we already understand as mattering,
until a controversy arose which mattered to the North American academy, little attention
was paid to the holistic context and philosophical implications of Menchú’s narrative,
implications whose subtleties might have helped derail the polarized debate around I,
Rigoberta Menchú. The question becomes, then, why did our disciplinary interpretive
frameworks— however much they may have championed Menchú’s narrative and her
6

right to narrate it—fail to provide a hermeneutics capable of guarding her discursive acts
from predictable attempts to delegitimize it? Clearly, as Mary Louise Pratt as argued in
the wake of the controversy, “we still lack well-developed theoretical frameworks for
specifying what testimonio is…the lack of such interpretive and ethical frameworks has
left the field open to the application of norms that are irrelevant or arbitrary”.24
This “lack,” in my opinion, was promulgated by our inability to, as it were, pay
close attention to Menchú’s narrative outside the boundaries of our respective academic
projects, and how her text fit or didn’t fit into such projects. With this thesis I attempt to
address this gap, albeit paradoxically since I recognize my own interests— derived from
my own personal experiences as a transnational Latin American woman— in the deep
desire to express oneself verbally, to speak and be heard in one’s own terms. As Lyotard
has noted, when “a plaintiff is derived of a means of arguing” s/he “thereby becomes a
victim”.25 But I am aware of this tension, and continue to reengage it again and again in
the hopes of staying close to what I actually hear (as dissonant) versus what I think I hear
(as familiar) when I listen to the Other.
Thus, in the fourth chapter, The Small Voice of History: Subalternity and the
Latin American Testimonial Narrative, I situate a more formal analysis of Testimonio on
the belief that there is no such thing as a neutral or ahistorical standpoint, that
understanding can come from anything less than a deep connection with a historical
background of social relations which we ‘know,’ not on mentalistic terms, but prereflectively in our mundane, everyday acts and practices. In this part, I develop an
interpretation of the historical dimension of discursive practices as foundational for any
discussion of Testimonio, mainly as a way of reinvigorating the conversation about the
social and historical preconditions necessary for texts to be seen and interpreted in any
one way or another. It is an attempt to rethink testimonial practice, not in the wake of the
Stoll-Menchú controversy, but in spite of it.
What arises out of these first four chapters then, collectively, is a tremendous
emphasis on the incommensurable nature of cross-cultural exchange; a predicament
grounded on the existence of radical differences between cultures, where “difference” is
seen as deep immersion into fundamentally different customs, practices, and activities.
All of which begs the question: if it is the case that those on the periphery—that is, those
on the margins of the social fabric and unrepresented ‘gaps’ in Official History— cannot
effectively communicate due to the incommensurable nature of divergent worldviews,
how can culturally privileged agents possibly mobilize politically in response to subaltern
attempts to vocalize oppression? How can one help, mobilize, act?
Mindful of the preeminent status given to political agency in cultural studies, this
thesis breaks with the traditional demands of political praxis, and bears the responsibility
for doing so, in order to reconnect with certain aspects of existence which have been
covered over by the hierarchical binaries of colonialism. As a historical restructuring of
social relations, colonialism has destroyed many, if not all, pre-colonial resources of
social expression. This loss of linguistic resources, in turn, is invariably reproduced
when subaltern subjects attempt to speak through modern narratological conventions: In
7

short, in gliding between worlds, one with residual traces of understanding and the other
with new, master tools for expression, slippage occurs—this is a slippage of meaning. To
be sure, by ‘breaking’ with certain demands for political praxis in interpreting Testimonio
I do not mean “not concerned with” the same way Spivak is certainly not disinterested in
effecting material forces for change. To the contrary, creating conditions for the
possibility of effective political agency is what I am most concerned with, but it is a task
which I think can only be adequately addressed when we come to grips with a
background understanding of our own everyday practices, because these practices shape
how we engage the Other we believe ourselves to be helping, or trying to help. Rather
than hearing what the subaltern speaker is saying, we fall prey to the conventions of our
time, our history, and end up affecting their discursive attempts by resubalternizing them.
The question of political agency is hence a question to be suspended from this thesis, but
only in order to investigate what it is that makes the “agency” of the political agent
possible to begin with.
Furthermore, I take very seriously the idea that social theorizing can be an
impediment for change insofar as it is often jargony, hyper-specialized, and remains at
the level of ‘talk,’ or worse, ‘talk about talk’. However, what I find odd is the idea that
the urgency of the situation created by colonialism—the situation that Menchú finds
herself in—is a distinctly modern emergency. Yes, struggles have intensified, the rise of
authoritarian governments and escalations of sectarian violence are engulfing the world
stage, with death tolls increasing by the day in Liberia, Chad, the Highlands of
Guatemala as in the border city of Juarez, Mexico, where daily disappearances of women
fail to make even the back page of our newspapers.
Yet sometimes, in the midst of insurgency, an emergency meeting is needed to
reorganize, to take new situations into account (and strategize accordingly), to reassess
old assumptions, and converge on an idea which may have always been there, but we
lacked the viewpoint to be able to see it as something worth seeing. This is part of
oppression, I believe, the limiting of options, particularly with regard to viewpoints. To
put it in perspective, “the struggle”, as it stands, has been waged—and is still being
waged-- for some five hundred years now, and yet we are still at a point in our cultural
relations that when an indigenous peasant woman speaks of immense suffering, of
Amerindian massacres, she is called a liar. The rifle can wait. A meeting must be called.
And so the fifth chapter of this thesis attempts to do just that; to take a breath, a
step back, not to disengage ourselves from our commitments, from the stands we have
taken, but to reassess how we can engage the project of decolonization by dismantling the
theoretical attitude of the disengaged spectator, paying careful attention instead to the
descriptive accounts of subaltern life. I believe that we cannot stand outside of something
we wish to understand; in fact, it is not possible. We must continually ask: can we hear
the accounts of the subaltern on their own terms, and if we cannot, as Spivak has
suggested, what can we do? Even more, what must one be like to be able to hear for the
unsaid?
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I suggest in chapter five, borrowing from phenomenology, that we adopt a
method of reading subaltern texts which is continually on the way, always unfinished, but
pointing towards possible approaches or openings for equitable discursive practices
between cultures. On this view, my suggestion emphasizes the importance of continually
reengaging our constitutive role as readers. Because, as readers, we actively participate
in the constitution of creating openings and spaces in which meaning can emerge, we
must recognize that both meaning and text are multiple, not monological. Cultivating
multiplicity, that is, the open-ended perspective that ought to orient our reading practices,
lets the life of the subaltern be: in the way the stories, memories, narrative practices and
customs are woven together in patterns distinctive to Subalternity.
And so, letting be, on this view, entails more than a type of “imaginative
identification” with the Other. It requires an applied phenomenology to the practice of
reading and to our own understanding of what a text is. Principally, we must understand
what Spivak meant, following Heidegger, by “the worlding of worlds” that makes
(im)possible genuine cross-cultural communication. In so doing, our goal then ought to
be to hearken for, to hear how it is that the Other relates to herself by rethinking (and this
is one way among many) our current understanding of narratology,26 not in terms of a
static structure, but in terms of a dynamic event or happening.
The very power of Testimonio, originally, was its ability to induce a certain
degree of wakefulness in the reader by destabilizing traditional expectations etched out
by the canonical text. Narratology, when viewed through the lens of Western epistemic
orthodoxies, has temporalized texts as static things, as petrified objects to be manipulated
and dissected. Thus, in keeping with the need to pluralize models of engagement with
texts, my methodology for this project is drawn from an interdisciplinary constellation of
postcolonial and literary theory, history, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and feminism.
To be sure, no answer is proposed, no academic dispute adjudicated. What is
affirmed, however, is a very specific methodology; an approach to reading subaltern texts
which resists giving answers, much less the ‘right’ one, as it constitutes a continuous,
active engagement with texts as living creations. The purpose is to not break contact with
the movement of life but to pay attention to the fluidity of life as it is happening, and in
so doing, mitigate the influence of our Western objectifying tradition.
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CHAPTER ONE
Cross-Cultural Communication and the Principle of
Incommensurability

“Amergo Vespucci the voyager arrives from the sea. A crusader standing erect,
his body in armor, he bears the European weapons of meaning… This is a
writing that conquers. It will use the New World as if it were a blank, ‘savage’
page on which Western desire will be written. It will transform the space of the
other into a field of expansion for a system of production.”
-- Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History

Commensurability, it has been said, requires the attuned ear of the Other. In the
context of interpersonal communication, commensurability implies that what is being
said can be understood by the listener as a meaningful connection or association through
the usage of a shared metric of conceptual exchange. In Western culture, for instance, this
metric is the narrative logic of non-contradiction as a regulatory minimum for
communication. To this end, when speech acts are enacted in a culturally homogeneous
situation, commensurability is generally made possible my mutual enculturation into
collective normative frameworks and discursive standards through which negotiation of
differences can take place. And, although the nature of such a normative structure can, by
privileging certain identities, itself limit the equitable conciliation or preservation of
differences (disenfranchising subjects on the basis of sexual orientation, age, or gender),
when the speaker and listener are positioned in separate cultures, commensurability
becomes particularly difficult. Here, the shared metric of conceptual exchange operative
intraculturally ceases to function as the commonplace mechanism for signification;
because the acts and practices of the foreign culture (which from the standpoint of one’s
own culture appears as uncanny) may develop resources of expression more at home with
those practices—such as paratactic linguistic structures—the very mechanism of
signification emerges to the foreground of cross-cultural discursive acts, not signification
itself. For instance, when one attempts to communicate with a non-native speaker whose
replies are in a foreign language, one becomes attentive to the fact that language is being
used as a communicative instrument.
Subsequent to the unsuccessful transmission of meaning, what is being
communicated surfaces to the listenr as something altogether different: as an apparent
collapse in the listener’s fulfillment of an expected meaning…that what is being said has
not been understood as something meaningful, but dissonant, strange. And, because
language is also informed by the everyday world it names, mouths, and points to, the
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more juxtaposed the everyday acts and practices of two cultures are, the more likely
commensurability between them is (im)possible…cross-cultural communication becomes
incommensurable.

Moreover, the problem of cross-cultural incommensurability is exponentially
intensified when material conditions accelerate the need to urgently communicate a
situation of bondage or oppression marked by life and death consequences. In
circumstances where the very cause of the oppressive conditions can be traced to the
hegemonic, imperialist practices of the dominant culture with whom one is compelled to
initiate dialogue in order to survive, disequilibrium in the originating ‘equality’ of
speaking positions is created. Thus, the speech acts of the peripheral subject are always
already situated in a subordinated relationship to the privileged norms of the dominant
culture. When this relationship is no longer dominant, the subaltern subject is no longer
speaking as a subaltern, and can therefore be heard in a meaningful way through a
common metric of expressibility.27 Spivak’s famous question of whether the subaltern
can speak is answered negatively because of this; if it is meaningful in the normative
framework in which the ear of the other is used to listening, then the commensurable
nature of the exchange effectively sublimates the differences endemic to the category of
subaltern.
When the voice of the speaker is conditioned by a foreign scaffolding of
intelligibility, the unifixed ear of the other can only hear what is already intelligible
through one’s own historical epistemology. By this I simply mean that all of our
purported knowledge, whether in the so-called objective sciences or ‘common sense,’
originates in what is initially given to the knowing subject, thus coloring the subsequent
nature of the subject’s formulation of claims as a producer of knowledge in a culture.
Consequently, whenever unanimity in a conceptual metric is lacking, the
incommensurability of the message is what comes through. But this gap-in-knowledge,
however influential a factor in the commensurability of ideas, is not often verbalized or
adequately acknowledged in the context of Western communicative theory. In fact, it is
so deeply rooted in the Enlightenment project of transhistorical principles of rationality
that modern confidence in the factual reproducibility of culturally normative content
(through the existence of what appear to be shared discursive forms, such as alphabetbased languages) can be misleading, for it does not follow that the normative value of the
original concept can be perfectly replicated in the foreign epistemic framework of
valuation.
As a case in point, in the original Colonial encounter with Mayan culture, the lack
of a common metric of expressibility induced in the colonial observer what Heidegger
might refer to as a type of ‘breakdown’ where a sudden fracture in everyday, quotidian
familiarity with habitual practices leads to an anxiety-provoking loss of meaning.28 Here,
meaning is framed as one’s basic orientation in the world—the ability to see an object or
experience as what one is predisposed to see it as, thus achieving the status of meaning
through a fulfillment of expectation. An experience is meaningful because we understand
it; we understand it because we have been ushered into a world where the experience in
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question already ‘makes sense’ and has not been subject to experiences forcing critical
deautomatization of our mode of engagement with our world. Thus, when colonial
observers cast their first glance upon the Mayan hieroglyphic codices carved in relief,
their anthropological assessment took the following form in the mid-sixteenth century:
“The forms of their letters are nothing like ours, but are much more crooked and
entangled, like fishhooks, knots, snares, stars, dice; they are almost meaningless.”29

The narrative logic of Mayan language, if and in what way it would have been
conceived by the Mayans, was not communicable to the first colonial observers because,
for one thing, their hieroglyphics lacked a visible metric of translatability (perhaps a
linear alphabet) for the Spaniards to see it as a narrative logic in the first place, much less
as what Mayans actually purported the codices to say. However, this misrecognition of
meaning can have highly consequential ramifications for the misunderstood speaker,
especially when the misrecognition is done by culturally privileged agents with access to
the writing instruments of official history. In a recent influential article, “Post/Colonial
Toponymy: Writing Forward in Reverse” the cultural anthropologist Quetzil Castañeda
cites the naming of the Yucatán peninsular region as a prime example of cross-cultural
misrecognition, but one with deep significance to the configuration of postcolonial power
relations. He writes:
“The discourse on the naming of the Yucatán has become a topos not only of
Yucatán but of Latin American colonial discourse criticism, since it economically marks
the complex textual inversion of alterity forged in the encounter between European and
Indian.”30

The story of the naming of the Yucatan, he writes, constituted an arbitrary (because it
was not seen by the Spaniards as arbitrary, but as universal truth) imposition of the
Spaniard’s logic of interpretation on Indian words and speech acts. He reproduces
Tzvetan Todorov’s (1984) congruent claim that
“when the Spaniards discovered this land, their leader asked the Indians how it
was called; as they did not understand him, they said uuyik a t’aan, which means, ‘what
do you say’ or ‘what do you speak’, that ‘we do not understand you’. And then the
Spaniard ordered it set down that it be called Yucatan…” 31

Told in a slight variation, Castañeda writes:
“When the Spaniards landed—landed on this ‘tierra del faisán y venado’ this
‘land of pheasant and deer’—the Indians called it ‘u luum cutz, u luum ceh’; and, when
they met the natives who approached, they asked, ‘what is the name of this land?’ Not
understanding k’astrant’aan (i.e. Spanish), one Mayan turned to the other and exclaimed,
“Uuy ku t’aan!’ [Listen how they talk!]”32

As a major outcome of this violent misappropriation of Mayan linguistic
expressions, modern Mayans have had to re-make intelligible their own world back from
colonial (mis)translations. Moreover, the Herculean task of unconcealing the resources of
expression concealed by colonialism is particularly difficult for Mayans because current
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expressions—such as the widespread popular use of Yucatán to designate an ancestral
Mayan dwelling rather than the original “we do not understand you”— have been
normativized by official representations of colonial history as foundational facts; namings
vested by the Spaniard’s powerful claims of authority to be subsequently certified into
timeless, encyclopedic form.
What the Mayans can do, and have been doing through examples such as
Rigoberta Menchú’s descriptions of ceremonial life and customs, is supplementing
official representations of history with what I refer to as historical memory; cultural acts
and practices—i.e. a word, festival, dance, gaze, poem, food, or the oral recitation
thereof—which call up again and again the significance of certain cultural values through
built-in instructions necessary to preserve a culture: how to sing the names of the
forefathers, never to step over cornhusks or discard Maize, eating lime instead of fruit,
telling the story of the White Man at every ceremony. Thus, for modern Mayans, the
word “Yucatan”, or U-kal-peten
“is the name of the year when the foreigners arrived, the year one thousand five
hundred and nineteen. This was the year when the foreigners arrived, here at our town,
(the town) of us Itzá, here in the land of Yucalpeten, Yucatan, in the Mayan Language of
the Itzas… This is the year which was current when the foreigners prepared to seize
Yucalpeten [Neck-of-the-Land] here. It was known by the priest, the prophet Ah Xupan
as he is called”33

Whereas a dominant culture needs a certain degree of forgetfulness to regenerate,
cultures all but dismembered by colonialism must canonize the value of remembering if
they are to survive. In this sense, narratives of the Jewish holocaust have a special point
of congruence with Mayan narratives; they both serve to re-call again and again a
historical event which can never be wrested from near memory, lest their culture face it
again. The metonymic value of Mayan narratives, moreover, relies heavily on the force of
repetition to facilitate memorization of these value codes.
When placed in this framework, as an event of great epistemic violence, the
conquest was characterized by the intercontinental importation of instrumental logic, one
that, at the sight of a foreign text with no preassigned meaning in the Spanish language of
the colonizers, was set in motion for the purposes of breaking the ‘code’ of the Mayans.
This will towards authorial representation of the other’s sign and signifiers on our terms,
although not unique to Western imperial hubris, is arguably a historical characteristic of
the culture. Thus, although there exist those resilient codes such as the Naj Tunich glyphs
of Guatemalan Mayan culture (which as of today remain undeciphered but for an eyeblink longer), of the texts which anthropologists have successfully made suddenly
‘intelligible’, little can be made of their use, for, as one contemporary anthropologist
notes, “lamentably, the Mayan texts we have deciphered so far fail to speak of important
things we wish very much to know firsthand—records of trade and commerce,
inventories of building materials, listings of agricultural products”34—in other words,
things which can be calculated, quantifiably measured, and catalogued according to rules
of taxonomical categorization apposite to scientific knowledge.
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The history of Latin American narrativity, since the colonial imposition
onwards, has been marked by a struggle for reconciling the adequacy of the colonial
discourse to address the pre-predicative indigenous world-view in the absence of viable
alternatives (in the form of surviving languages). Subaltern discursive norms are always
therefore predetermined in advance by a speaking subject’s historically marginalized
situation of enunciation in what can be described as a “culturally asymmetrical power
relation.” 35 For those on the loosing side of the historical equation, then, “as a name for
the general attribute of subordination,”36 Ranajit Guha refers to the subaltern as the
peripherally constructed subjects of history, emphasizing the unbalanced nature of the
relation between privileged and marginal declarative authorities. For the post-colonial
subject, then, the problem of self-constancy, taking a stand on your own self and culture
in order to self-legitimate, is inextricably tied to the past imposition of western culture,
the result of which is hybridity and frustration in efforts of decolonization. This is
because in order to decolonize, the Latin American post-colonial subject is faced with the
daunting task of mobilizing projects of liberation against colonial thinking using the very
colonial epistemology which originally constrained one. Some theorists such as Audre
Lorde believe this to be the central problem of epistemic decolonization, insofar as “the
tools of the master will never dismantle the master’s house”.37
Because effective communication requires at minimum, the mutual reciprocity of
the acknowledgement that both discussants have the right to speak for themselves,
whether in intersubjective communication or through representative ideological
apparatuses such as texts, the problem of how the dominant culture engages, interprets,
and defines the subaltern voice as an object of inquiry subject to rules and standards of
culturally-dominant knowledge is of primary importance. Thus, when the anthropologist
William Haviland, here referring specifically to the Guatemalan Mayan codices, reasserts
that “not even the ‘glyps’,” as he calls the Mayan’s textual production, “speak for
themselves,” and that “we need to check out what they say against the archeological
record,” he is asserting his right, in the name of the anthropological discipline’s scientific
preeminence, to interpret Mayan cultural production on his own terms.38 Such a practice
is grounded on the belief in the existence of an objective referent, the ‘archeological
record,’ (itself a cultural construction of knowledge by the victors in the colonial
imposition) against which the ‘truth’ of the codices may exist as ‘facts’. However, as
Ofelia Schutte has pointed out with respect to the “guiding presuppositions” of “Western
conceptual orthodoxies” such as those underpinning Haviland’s claims,
“Knowledge is not culture-free but determined by the methodologies and data
legitimated by dominant cultures. In other words, the scientific practices of a dominant
culture are what determine not only the limits of knowledge but who may legitimately
participate in the language of science”. 39

If what constitutes knowledge in the western hegemonic configuration of
discourse is adherence to the methodological principles legitimated by the rules of the
‘dominant culture’, then to what extent can those of the ‘subaltern culture’, to use
Schutte’s phraseology, engage in bilateral (that is, equitable) discursive practices across
cultures? Surely negotiation cannot take place when one side holds all the cards by
legitimating the nature of the instrument through which discussion can take place. But
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this is exactly the claim I am making of Western communicative rationality operative in
disciplinary frameworks; that it pillars the possibility of disciplinary discourse as a
resubalternizing practice which can, in turn, be seen as the prevailing problem governing
the declarative legitimacy of the Latin American narrative form known as Testimonio.
Testimonio, first coined in the 1960’s by the ethnologist Miguel Barnet40 as a
“first person narrative based on eye witness accounts”41 has been said to represent “the
powerful textual affirmation of the [subaltern] speaking subject”42 due principally to the
genre’s unconventional disavowal of formalist literary devices; the prose is simple,
drawing from popular conventions (i.e. the linguistic resources already at hand) in such a
way as to produce an oral counter-formalist effect to canonical Western literature. This
effect, in turn, has proved helpful to advanced literary theory in deconstructing the
ubiquitous authority of master literary narratives such as the bourgeois novel.
And yet, according to Gugelberger, testimonial narratives have been “undergoing
a reappropriative process; a transmutation wherein the text’s implicit socially situated
urgency is supplanted by reducing its functional value to a counter-formalism”43In
wishing to develop more foundational articulations of Testimonio as a fixed form,
scholars of Testimonio attempted to establish its definition by ascribing general qualities,
properties, and essential attributes such as an “implicit” “socially situated urgency”.
While this latter attribute may be generally agreeable to many a scholar, especially those
concerned with mobilizing projects of liberation, the very act of trying to ascribe
permanent qualities to the mechanism through which testimonialistas—narrators of lifestories— can legitimately speak opened the door for theorists to conflate the “eye witness
account” feature with the modern legal connotation of giving testimony. This conflation
resulted from the transposition of the theorists’ own conceptual orthodoxies onto the
object of study; to recall Certeau’s eloquence, the desire to formalize Testimonio using
the European tools of colonialism “will transform the space of the other into a field of
expansion for a system of production”. Hence, giving testimony, the anthropologist
David Stoll will insist in his book Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor
Guatemalans, emphasizes what he sees as the fundamental “reportage” or “documentary
quality” of the genre. Testimonialistas become givers of testimony in a subordinate
relationship to those taking, recording, and evaluating their testimony for credibility and
contradiction. Thus, what began as a way to tell a life story, ended up as a way to
document Truth—from a way of speaking to a standard for selective listening.
As the descriptive telling of a story, it is generally agreed that “traditional
testimonial genre began with the chronicles of the conquest,” gaining formal articulation
only in the twentieth century due to the emergence of the many projects of national
liberation and state-building throughout the third world. 44 However, the difference
between the original chronicles of the conquest and the textual production of testimonial
literature centers on who is doing the speaking; thus the legitimacy of one’s position of
subjectivity becomes an important question of testimonial literature, and by association,
Subaltern Studies. For example, Bartolome de Las Casas’ An Account, Much
Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies, written in 1540, stands out as perhaps the
most well-known chronicled account of the conquest. Here, Las Casas writes as a first
person eye-witness, a direct informant to the King of Spain, Charles V, over the
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destruction of the Amerindian peoples. As an already-credible European proxy, Las
Casas bypasses the corralling placement of the witness stand and can directly (albeit
through rhetorical devices) bring suit against what he sees as the Spanish explorers’
rapturous violence unbecoming of Christian virtues. To be sure, his claims there were ‘no
souls left’ in the entire islands of Cuba, San Juan [today Puerto Rico] and only about
“two hundred souls”45 which he and his men could verifiably count, could today be seen
as hyperbole; as “mythic inflations” employed as a rhetorical device to speak to the King
of Spain in such a way as to get his attention, impress upon him the urgency of the
situation, and enliven the King’s conscience to intervene in the violence out of duty to
Christian mercy and benevolence.
Despite the voluminous scholarship devoted to Las Casas since the text’s
inception, no scholarly critic to date has impeached Las Casas’ entire account of the
conquest by ascribing to him the purposeful intention to deceive the people of Spain. And
yet, four and a half centuries later, when a Guatemalan Mayan Indian woman, Rigoberta
Menchú, acting as an eye-witness to the destruction of her indigenous community, gives
her testimony of the violent atrocities against her own people she is accused of “mythic
inflations” of the very “facts” she purports to narrate, evoking a response from many
critics to label her entire story “a fraud”46.
The most evident difference between Menchú and Las Casas, then, is their
cultural status as speakers; in I, Rigoberta Menchú, Menchú is speaking as the native
informant herself. To this end, what has become ossified since the conquest, mostly in
ways which are no longer transparent, is the operative logic of our discursive norms—
namely, the logic of Western conceptual orthodoxies as calcified through the victorious
history of the West in the paradigm of colonialism. The journalist-turned-anthropologist
David Stoll is shaped by this very framework of intelligibility to the extent that he is
insisting on the supervenience of the verification theory over the claims made by
subalterns; what is at stake is the prevailing of ways to objectively verify truth, to
distinguish between fact and falsehood through the use of research methods that seek out
the empirically verifiable. What is largely lost, however, is the understanding that how it
is a memory gets encoded depends largely on the penumbral juncture of psychological,
material, and linguistic forces already present in the subject’s framework of intelligibility,
for Stoll as for Menchú. Rather than striving for recognition that a subject in distress is
urgently trying to communicate, asking us to pay attention, Stoll’s ear reaches for the
fulfillment of expectation through the largely incommensurable textual representation of
Menchú’s conceptual framework. He fails and in response flees from anxiety by
retrofitting her testimony to fit his expectations. He does this the only way he can: to
point out what he sees as logical contradictions.
Under such pressing circumstances, the context of inter-cultural communication
in Latin America and the third world has tended to take on a historically-deterministic
(many times Marxist) framework of the political. In an effort to avert inaction resulting
from discourses which stay at the level of theory, of ‘talk about talk,’ cultural
theoreticians such as John Beverley respond to the question “who are we to believe,”
Menchú’s story or Stoll’s version—the incriminating accusations of the oppressed or the
exculpating evidence of the oppressors—not with a critical evaluation of culturally16

specific socio-historical frameworks as grounds for understanding the inequity of the
relationship, but with a construction of subaltern discourse that is structurally political.
For this reason Beverley sees testimonial literature as a form of resistance, as an
ideological apparatus which can act as a viable force to effect material change. But
change can take many forms aside from visible material change; structural change for
instance may necessitate an understanding of the nature of the many ideological forces
which influence our self-identification and psychological formation as ‘political
subjects’.
However, Beverley’s resolute claim that the solution to the problems afflicting
third world peripheral subjects “will in the end be decided on political rather than
epistemological grounds”47 is partly right; the auratization of epistemology as the
essential backdrop against which our knowledge of the world, understanding of
conditions, and ideas emerge makes possible the very stance of the detached, neutral
spectator so injurious to our attentiveness of lived experience. But whereas settling a
dispute on ‘epistemic grounds’ is really not settling anything specific but rather
transpositioning the discourse of the dispute according to one epistemic convention or
another, what can be of assistance is a view of epistemic frameworks as products of
particular historical paradigms such as humanism or colonialism.
Such paradigms, like the principles of the Enlightenment, are never
transcendental, but derivative of an eventful convergence of very specific social and
political matrixes indicative of a culture. And while we can adopt many of these
paradigms as useful, practical metaphors, if we understand “political” to mean taking a
non-disinterested stand towards a desired outcome—a stand that involves voicing support
or opposition of ideas, policies or conditions through various cultural mechanisms— then
history, on this view, is always political, for it is already laden with all the stands that
have been, or are capable of being taken. What does not exist, moreover, is a historical
‘grand design’; a teleological or deterministic truth to human history because history is
itself contingent, drawn by flux to produce narratives of slavery, colonialism, and
holocausts as well as narratives of science, Renaissance humanism, or empire. But one is
not to despair, for the pervasiveness of these narratives can be mitigated by unconcealing
the set of assumptions which have made them viable possibilities in the first place: we
can still ask; ‘why this rather than that,” to lead us to the most important question: ‘what
must a culture be like to find one narrative infinitely preferable, to make possible the
grafting of one possibility over another and call it “history?” In this sense human agents
are always at the foreground of historical processes.
Yet what is still being lost is this sense of history as constitutive of our conceptual
prejudices. Thus, if awareness is to precede liberation, we must understand ourselves in a
manner which will entail accounting for the forces which act back on our choices.
Furthermore, politics proper is itself deeply rooted in the disputation of difference; by
privileging political engagement through the explicit exclusion of normative frameworks
which guide and inform the nature of those differences, Beverley effaces the possibility
of accepting different ways of being political. It is tantamount to forcing the other to
speak only in ways we already find meaningful (by way of monopolizing what counts as
discourse) and is itself an act that reproduces subalternity by legislating standards.
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Caught in the midst of those standards, Menchú’s text has been a site for
contention in the North American academy, acting as a polarized battleground over the
possibilities, constrains, and politics of cross-cultural communication and multicultural
principles. On the one side, David Stoll accuses “Beverley and his colleges have been
promoting Testimonio in a way that does not allow questioning its
reliability”.48Gathering the naming of allies, Beverley responds as follows:
“Spivak is concerned with the way in which elite representation effaces the
effective presence of the subaltern. Stoll’s case against Menchú is precisely that: a way
of, so to speak, resubalternizing a narrative that aspired to (and achieved) hegemony”49

But Beverley, as seen earlier, is complicit in this subalternizing practice, although
at a much less superficial level than Stoll. Beverley, with all his good intentions (visible
through the intensely self-critical nature of his writings) wants to transcend questions of
reliability in order to concretize the possibility of an ideological imaginary for
international solidarity in liberation movements. But what the patterns of attacking and
defending what the subaltern voice really means, is capable of meaning, or incapable of
communicating is, in a way, reproducing subalternity by legislating through theory how it
is the subaltern can, cannot, or ought to speak. There is no way out of is, for every
description, every narration, is in essence a selective account of what one chooses to
listen for. What is to be done, then? A curative reply would be to affirm the Buberian
dictum: “you shall not withhold yourself,” and discharge what is best in us, our
skepticism of universals, into the task of clarifying what is to be undone. In other words,
what projects should we take up in order to demystify and fetch out of its state of
normalcy the assumptions and prejudices operative when we talk to the other? This is
what I take the project of phenomenology to entail; to emphasize the descriptive account
over the editorialized narrative, the aggregative over the analytical, the holistic and
contextual over the instrumental, yet without invoking binary relations in between. If
hearing is something we let happen in contradistinction with something we will to do, as
in listening, the opportunities for hearing the subaltern speaker on her own grounds,
however dissonant to our ears, will be maximized.
Using the debate crystallized by the emergence of the Latin American testimonial
narrative as a counter-hegemonic practice in the twentieth century, one can better see
how the imposition of the colonial metric of expressibility (understood herein as the
instrumental aspect of Western scientific rationality and the importation of foreign
linguistic frameworks) on the narrative logic of subaltern lived experience has provided a
normative scaffolding in which cultural practices that create, sustain, and reinscribe
subalternity can thrive. The discursive practices of the disciplinary franchise of the North
American academy, through the dialectic pendulum of “pro” and “contra” theses
(summarily characteristic of the formalist, anthropological and political articulations of
Testimonio) promulgate what I call a “monopoly of legitimation” with respect to the
theoretical configurations of ideological apparatuses. These disciplinary configurations,
through the ossifying nature of their applied everyday practice (from which specialized
vocabularies can emerge as the norm) can have the effect of monopolizing what
constitutes as “the right way,” as a legitimated cultural apparatus through which a
subaltern subject can (or is most likely to) attain agency. The end result of which, it can
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be argued, is the possible effacement or cultural concealment of alternate ways subaltern
subjects may self-legitimate in response to the condition of coloniality.
Put in other words, if testimonial discursive practice becomes established, as I
argue it has been, as a dominant tool for combating Western cultural hegemony, what
then becomes of subjects who cannot openly engage in testimonial discursive practice
and must thereby be read for in-between the lines; in the breath, the caesura of the
unsaid? In this sense, cross-cultural communication, whether through a narrative text or
phonetic vocalization, is about power, about how culturally asymmetrical speaker/listener
relations are not created, but unconsciously inscribed through the nature and normative
portent of our practices. For this reason, in keeping with the plurality of panoramic
perspectives so important to phenomenology, my selective reading of Menchú’s narrative
as descriptions of everyday Mayan life is not the ‘right’ way to read her, but remains only
one way among many, a flash amongst the stars. Let us begin.
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CHAPTER TWO
LETTING CONTEXT BE: HISTORY AND THE RIGOBERTA
MENCHÚ CONTROVERSY
“At a time when rumor, myth, representation and the construction of what we consider
‘real’ pose fascinating issues, it has become all too easy to deprecate the task of
separating truth from falsehood, deferring instead to the authority of fashionable forms
of victimhood.”
--David Stoll, Rigoberta Mernchú and he Story of All Poor
Guatemalans
“Perhaps the proper question of someone who has not been allowed to be the subject of
history is to say: What is man that he was obliged to produce such a text of history?”
-- Gayatri Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic

In order to reconnect with a non-instrumental, contextual approach to reading
Rigoberta Menchú’s narrative it is essential to come to grips with the historical terrain
from which it emerges. This involves accounting for colonialism’s effect on Mayan
culture (an effect which shows up in her narrative as a constant concern with cultivating
cultural practices) and secondly, for the more recent armed conflict in Guatemalan
history— a conflict that led to, among other things, the murder of Menchú’s family. It is
only when these conditions have come into focus for the reader that a clearer, more
perspectival view of the Stoll-Menchú controversy can emerge.

To begin, in Mesoamerica, which consists of the central and lower regions of
modern Mexico and Central America, three ethnic groups prevailed during the precolonial period: The Aztecs, Mayans, and the Olmecs, also the oldest. Although all three
groups were stratified by great linguistic diversity and virtually no centralized systems of
power, they shared a common narrative in colonialism50. During what is known as the
Classical Era (250 – 900 A.D.), these civilizations coexisted through both stable and
warring relations, producing cultures steeped in social interactions and ceremonial life.
As a resource of expression, one often used to codify official narratives, Mayan
civilization also possessed a paratactic system of written communication. Mayan codices,
akin to Cuneiform or Sumerian, utilized a basic unit of writing known as a ‘glyph’;
collectively, these glyphs expressed in detail, among other things, Mayan cosmological
descriptions, many of which anthropologists have struggled to decode insofar as they
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resist translation into modern syntactical systems of language. The difficulty also lies in
that many of the codices were not read, but sung.

However, near the end of the Post-Classic period (900 – 1540 ad), habitual PostClassic Mayan life and culture practically collapsed51 in the wake of the colonial
encounter. The Colonial Period in Mesoamerica does not begin with the customary date
of 1492 because, although Columbus’ first voyage to the ‘New World’ took place that
year, Hernan Cortez did not arrive in Mexico until 1519, conquering Mexico City two
years later in 1521. It was this decade (1520’s) that saw the invasion of Menchú’s
ancestral Guatemala and Central America.
In order to conquer over what they saw as a worldview deviating from the norms
of the Western civilizing mission, the raze-and-burn cultural policy administered by the
Spaniards saw to it that any visible evidence of habitual ways of Mayan life were
uprooted: whether through the destruction of temples, murder of Mayan elite, or
imposition of a monolithic, foreign language. Moreover, the execution of Mayan kings
and elite signified, for the culture, the profound loss of a traditional point of reference in
social relations, making it difficult for survivors to resituate their identity following the
conquest. As the Guatemalan scholar Arturo Arias has noted,
“When the Spaniards conquered Guatemala in the early sixteenth century…they
executed the entire Mayan elite. In one of history’s first holocausts, it is estimated that
as many as two and a half million Mayans died in the fifty years following the
conquest.”52

Yet of those who survived, without their language or rituals to practice, modern Mayans
were, metaphorically speaking, already dead. It is this ‘historical memory’ over the death
of important cultural practices, as we shall see later, that becomes critical in
understanding Menchú’s often-cited emphasis on “secrets.”
During the colonial period, a new system of social relations emerged based on
powerfully hierarchical and exclusionary structures. Unlike Mayan hierarchies and
priestly cast systems of the Classical and Post-Classical Era, which required increasing
degrees of self-sacrifice the higher up one stood in society, the Spanish system of identity
classification rested on notions of biological and, more importantly, geographic origin.
Resting on a subject-object dichotomy, power structures in the New World were thus
upturned from their traditional basis in obligation to others, to privilege over others; from
communal obligation to the tribal unit, to respite from communal obligation based solely
on a higher social standing. One of the lasting ramifications of this historical shift in
communal relations and responsibility can be seen today in the “culture of indemnity”
propagated by 20th century Latin American dictators and the military.
Thus, in the early sixteenth century, at the top of the totem pole, looking down,
sat social groups composed of Spaniards born in Spain, followed by the first generation
of New World-born Spaniards, called criollos. And, since women did not accompany the
original conquerors to the New World, those born of the union between Spaniards and
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Indians became known as mestizo(a)s, a mixed, lower-ranked race which became the
biological foundation for Latin America’s non-Indian population, also known today as
Ladinos. After mestizos, were Indians, survivors of the conquest, followed only by
African slaves imported by Spaniards for labor.
At this same time the king of Spain began sending viceroys, colonial
administrators, to look after the interests of the Spanish empire in the newly conquered
territories. The administrative tools they brought with them consisted of new political,
religious, and linguistic systems, all of which became key in homogenizing the
Amerindian diversity of the region. To this end, it has been said that to master a people
you must take away their language. In this manner, the imposition of Castilian became a
tool for oppression because it excluded other languages, other resources of expression
more at home with lived Amerindian experience. To be clear, there is no such thing as an
organic “Spanish language” native to Latin America; it is the Spanish crown’s
importation of Castilian, which was said to be made from a pure form of Latin, that gave
the Americas “Spanish”. Thus, the Latinization of the Americas by colonialism gave way
to the reconstitution of the region as “Latin America”.53 The effect of this historical event
on subaltern systems of signification, as will be seen, is often occluded from surface
view, but is nonetheless profoundly present in subaltern discursive practices.
Geopolitically, similar to Africa’s experience with Colonialism, regions were
arbitrarily reorganized along the creation of viceroyalties, also known as audencias, or
political districts. The Guatemalan audencia was first composed of contemporary
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Yet the political configuration of
Guatemala, today, is shaped less by its geopolitical boundaries than by its demographics;
of the surviving legions of Mayans (which now reside throughout Guatemala, Honduras,
Belize, Southern Mexico and the Yucatan Peninsula) the highest concentration live in the
central and western highlands of Guatemala, the area where Menchú is from. In fact, of
the eleven million people living in Guatemala today, over half are Mayan.54Thus, the
plight of indigenous peoples, of descendants from survivors of the colonial holocaust, is
closely linked with the history and fate of Guatemala.
In Guatemala, the period between the conquest and state independence—the
official date for the closing of the colonial period, and the beginning of the post-colonial
era— was marked by the institutionalization of racism and oppression against Mayans.
Replacing African slave labor, after 1871, “Mayans were forced by Ladinos to work
against their will in the coffee plantations,”55 despite the fact slavery had already been
abolished in the region. Furthermore, from 1871 until the 1940’s liberals governed
Guatemala, albeit only on paper. In practice, however, it was just the opposite; under the
guise of liberal reforms, president Justino Rufino Barrios (1873 – 1885) expropriated
large tracts of land from Mayans to parcel out to private owners. As a fundamentally
agrarian culture whose entire civilization centered on agricultural practices (as evidenced
by their astonishingly accurate calendars) the theft of land by Ladinos and Spaniards
became a pivotal part of Mayan historical memory. The conflict over the “land question”,
furthermore, underpins Menchú’s narrative and must therefore be explored in a historical
perspective.
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Under the new feudalist system of latifundium, the haciendas where Indians had
been forced to live also became the sole property of Ladinos. Without land of their own,
or property to their name, in order to live Mayans became indentured to the hacienda
landowners, in effect creating a system of slavery. This structure then became ossified
through successive governmental policies aimed at maintaining the current cast system in
place. Particularly, during President Manuel Estrada Cabrera’s (1898-1920) term in
office, Guatemalan wealth intensified due largely to the increased productivity in large
farm holdings, called fincas; a feat made possible only through the exploitation of Indian
labor.
Moreover, the transformation of Mayan labor from traditional collectivist
frameworks to bonded labor, and finally, to wage-labor, set the stage for Indian’s
receptivity towards ideologies based on social solidarity and organization. Unionization,
in particular, became an increasingly important part of the econo-political landscape
throughout the 1920s, culminating by the 1960’s in the establishment of organized
indigenous labor movements such as the Peasant Unity Committee, of which Menchú’s
father, Vicente Menchú, is reported to be the founder.
In addition, the 1920’s and 30’s were pivotal periods in Guatemala for two
reasons. First, the economic infrastructure built by profit-oriented Ladino elites during
this time made the country highly susceptible to influence by foreign markets. Because of
the topographical make-up and location of Guatemala, the country was well-suited for
agricultural production. However, rather than engaging in a diversified agricultural
system landowners maximized profit by streamlining production along a single crop or
two. Under pressure by the United States to produce raw, unfinished materials necessary
for manufacturing refined goods (where most profits lie), just as Cuba made sugar,
Guatemala made coffee and bananas. In fact, an astonishing eighty percent of the national
economy was based on these two crops alone. This type of import substitution economy,
where countries (usually those with a lower developmental standing, as in “third world”)
concentrate resources in order to produce a few, if not a single crop for exportation to
“first world” importers, acquired the economic term “banana republic” to designate
national overdependence on a single crop.
Most aptly suited to Guatemala, banana republics also became highly vulnerable
to the economic whims of importers, who, as bulk buyers, set the price of goods.
Furthermore, consolidating resources into a single national product meant that to obtain
equipment and machinery necessary to support production, primary-good producing
countries would have to import all of their refined goods back from abroad. Beginning in
the 1940’s, the “dependency theory” used to characterize Latin America by economists
consisted in highlighting the subordinated role of the primary-good producing country to
the import country, typically the United States. According to dependency theory, while
only a few elite and government officials grew rich in the banana republics, the import
country reaped a disproportionate economic advantage. It maximized profits through
several mechanisms, such a having a constant supply of cheap raw materials, a readymade market for exporting refined goods, and an expansive platform for expanding
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private-sector interests. This included large, private business holdings of foreign capital,
land, and infrastructure.
As would be expected, in 1929, following the collapse of the American stock
market, a severe unemployment crisis swept through Latin America that set in motion
certain material conditions ripe for protest. The sudden drop in American purchasing
power sent the price of crops crashing, creating massive agricultural lay-offs throughout
the region. It was partly in response to this economic crisis that the first ideological seeds
of communism began to be harvested in Central America.
The emergences of communist ideas in Guatemala, however, were perceived as a
direct threat to American business interests and to the Guatemalan elite which supported
their own social standing through those interests. For this reason, under the U.S.-backed
presidency of Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) Guatemalan labor movements saw the most
widespread repression since the institutionalization of slavery in colonial times.
With the rapid intensification of labor protests, wide-spread calls for social reform
and against the repression, Ubico’s dictatorship was toppled only through a full-blown
revolution (1944-1955). It was at this tumultuous moment in Guatemalan history that
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1950-54) entered the political arena. It is also the point where
the specific political conditions giving rise to three decades of internal war— the war
Menchú’s narrative depicts—began.
By the 1940’s over forty percent of all arable land in Guatemala, as well as nearly
all of the country’s railroads, were owned by the United States. The American company,
United Fruit, the largest produce company in the country, had amassed a fortune in
foreign interests throughout the first half of the twentieth century in Central America,
specifically in Guatemala. Its largest individual shareholder also happened to be the
brother of the sitting American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Jacobo Arbenz,
Guatemala’s first and only democratically-elected president, was feared by the United
Fruit Company to be a communist due to his campaign platform for agrarian reform.
Understanding the long history of conflict over land in Guatemala, and wishing to
rectify the misappropriation of traditional lands from the Mayan Indian majority, Arbenz,
in an unprecedented step, reclaimed and nationalized all the land holdings of the UFC
and was swiftly denounced by president Eisenhower. Arbenz responded by legalizing the
communist party. Then, in 1952, Arbenz instituted the region’s first land reform acts
since the conquest. Historians of Central America have since tended to agree this move
was perhaps the most progressive step towards reconciliation with the Indian
communities shattered by colonialism; the period between 1950-54 in Guatemala,
however, is often referred to as the “shattered hope,” because, as will be quickly seen, it
was not to last. In 1954, on Henry Kissinger’s orders, and under the approval of President
Eisenhower, the CIA led a coup in Guatemala that overthrew Arbenz. Subsequently, the
United States replaced him with a series of U.S.-financed and trained military regimes
friendly to U.S. interests. Thus began the militarization of the Guatemalan state, and with
this shift towards a totalizing centralization of power, also came governmental
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corruption, and, more importantly, the institutionalization of repression. As Carol Smith
has argued, the situational violence Menchú depicts can be seen as
“a national tragedy that had been brewing since a military government
took power in 1954. Military dictatorships motivated various forms of leftist protest,
nonviolent as well as violent, and mark the period when death squads began to eliminate
political activists, union leaders, indigenous leaders, and Christian Democrats... Racism
accounts for the nature of the “final solution” in the 1980’s—the huge massacres of
indigenous peoples”56.

Wishing to maintain the powerful political clout and standing created by the
backing of the United States, after being catapulted into power through the CIA coup, the
Guatemalan military began to consolidate power through a counter-revolutionary
campaign, persecuting political activists and anyone who “looked” like a communist, or
as the military called them, “subversives”. In return, para-military and guerilla
organizations (most notably the FAR- Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias) only fought
back harder, with the 1944 victory over the Umbico dictatorship still hovering as a near
memory. With Arbenz’s visionary land reforms revoked and returned to previous elite
owners, rebel forces throughout the country began mobilizing and adopting Marxist
ideologies. The government responded by deploying the infamous death squads Smith
alludes to throughout areas thought to be ripe for insurgency: namely, in the mountainous
highland regions where Mayan villages were located.
By the time General Efrain Montt came to power through an internal coup in
1982, the casualty tolls of Mayan Indians were increasing to the tens of thousands. It was
at this time that the violence reached its height; by the close of 1983, almost one hundred
thousand Mayan Indians had been assassinated by government forces. At precisely this
same moment in history, sitting in a Paris apartment alongside a professional
ethnographer, an Indian woman, a refugee from the violence, is telling her story to a taperecorder:
“My name is Rigoberta Menchú, I am twenty three years old. This is my
testimony. I didn’t learn it from a book and I didn’t learn it alone. I’d like to stress that
it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my people…my story is the story of all
poor Guatemalans” (1). 1

It is against the historical backdrop of systematic repression, exploitation, and
conflict that Menchú’s narrative emerges. It does not begin on page one, but some five
hundred years earlier, when the struggle for survival of her culture began. Owing to the
loss of traditional resources of expression and subsequent immersion in life-and-death
struggles, Menchú’s narrative should therefore be seen as a text produced always in the
wake of a breakdown in context, of a collapse in the internal relations definitive of a
culture. Those relations, in turn, are synonymous with the cultural practices of a
community. No one is more sensitive to this than those intimately affected by the
1

For practical purposes, I utilize the parenthetical numbering format specifically when
referencing I, Rigoberta Menchú. All added emphases are noted.
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disintegration of world-defining practices: “We survive because of our communities,”
says Menchú (158), and caring for those communities means having to cultivate
ceremonial and linguistic practices—things that cannot be propagated by genetic codes
alone— since “there are Indians who don’t wear Indian clothes and have forgotten their
languages, so they are not considered Indians” (167). Dressing in indigenous garments
may seem inconsequential to a foreign observer of Mayan culture, but their clothing is as
significant to them as texts are to any chirographic culture: “We express ourselves
through our designs, though our dress,” says Menchú “—our huipil for instance, is like an
image of our ancestors” (81). And, because every ethnic group has a particular ancestral
history, then “naturally, each ethnic group has its own forms of expression. Other groups
have different customs from ours. The meaning of their weaving patterns, for
example”(16).
Whereas the first colonial observers ardently tried to extract narrative continuity
from structures that most resembled recognizable forms of writing, as in the carved
codices, Mayans encoded their sense of history in more practical, seemingly mundane
places: their weaving, games, dances, songs, calendars and ceremonies. In the section
entitled “close to the human lifeworld” form Orality and Literacy, Walter Ong cites the
primacy of the practical, lived world, as the basis for expression in dominantly oral
cultures:
“In the absence of elaborate analytic categories that depend on writing to
structure knowledge at a distance from lived experience, oral cultures must conceptualize
and verbalize all their knowledge with more or less close reference to the human
lifeworld, assimilating the alien, objective world to more immediate, familiar interaction
of human beings. A chirographic (writing) culture and even more a typographic (print)
culture can distance and in a way denature even the human, itemizing such things as the
names of leaders and political divisions in abstract, neutral lists entirely devoid of a
human action context”57

Accordingly, when Menchú makes remarks such as: “It’s like expressing
ourselves through a tree, for example; we believe that tree is a being…” (80), or that “we
don’t actually have the word for God” (13) but dozens of words for maize [corn], it is
easy to see how the concrete life-world Ong speaks of could the conceptual basis for an
oral, indigenous culture. Moreover, Ong’s analysis also proves helpful in emphasizing
difference in comparative cultural analyses. To gain insight into an Indian perspective on
the conquest, for instance, one ought to consult not a text, but The Dance of the
Conquest, which according to Menchú “gives an exact meaning to what Indians think
about the Conquest” (206). Of course, only an Indian can access that ‘exact’ meaning by
virtue of growing into an understanding of the dance, and through dancing it itself. What
is more, developing a sense of communal closeness for Mayans does not happen by
possessing identical belief systems with other Indians, as in the Catholic Action’s
religious tenets, but by sharing peculiar practices and habits; as Menchú puts it, “we can
only love a person who eats what we eat” (203).
Likewise, because of the importation of different colonial metrics of
expressibility on Ameridinan linguistic practices, Menchú contends, “I came across
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linguistic barriers over and over again. We [Indians of different groups] couldn’t
understand each other and I wanted so much to talk to everybody and feel close…but I
couldn’t talk to them because they didn’t understand me and I didn’t understand
them”(164). Menchú attacked the problem in the following manner: “I asked them: ‘what
do you eat? How do you make your breakfast? What do you have for lunch? What do you
eat for supper?’ And yes, they said the same: ‘Well, in the morning we eat tortillas and
salt and a little pinol… at night we eat chile with tortillas, and then we go to sleep,”
leading her to conclude “so everything was the same” (118). They understood each other,
Menchú recounts, by describing things close to the “human lifeworld,” to use Ong’s term.
Yet the descriptions would not have achieved resonance in Menchú’s ear had she not
already grown into the meaning of those descriptions through everyday practice, through
a lived understanding of what is being described.
Additionally, for Mayans to consider themselves Mayans, they must not only
dress in Indian costume but speak as Indians speak; in other words, “everything has to be
in our language” (81). This is why “in the East [of Guatemala] there are no Indians now,”
not because indigenous bloodlines have dried out, but because “the Indians there have
forgotten their costumes, their languages. They no longer speak Indian languages” (169).
What's more, educating Mayan children meant teaching “them to speak as we spoke in
our language” (120), connoting one should not only use the local dialect, but also employ
conventional speaking practices, such as listening attentively versus speaking only to hear
one’s own reply. Because oral cultures transmit knowledge through memorization (made
possible by repetition and mnemonic devices), listeners in a linguistic exchange must pay
careful attention to what the speaker is saying in order to be able to repeat it. Whereas
reciting ancestral prayers is trouble-free because they are “prayers which have been
known to us for a long time—a very, very long time” (57), learning new prayers “is twice
the work for us” (81) since it requires more work; similarly, says Menchú, “we have a lot
of problems playing new songs because we have to memorize them” (85). Yet this
emphasis on the memorization of prayers and song in not without context; it calls our
attention to the handy function they serve— in part, as a “recalling [of] history, and, in
part, a call to awareness” (67) of the need to preserve Mayan culture. As an “immutable
way of keeping our ancestors’ intermediaries alive,” (80) i.e. as handed-down instructions
for the practice and maintenance of their customs, song and prayer became cornerstones
of Mayan ceremonial life in the wake of the Colonial encounter.
Without question, as with the Colonial era, the most significant effect of the
Guatemalan civil war on Mayan Indians became the stoppage of cultural practices due to
disruptive material conditions hostile to conducting ceremonies and to the simultaneous
loss of many expressive resources resultant from the imposition of foreign cultural tools
as earlier outlined. Menchú attests to the fact “many villages in El Quiché were unable to
perform their ceremonies because they were persecuted or because they were called
subversives and communists” (160). When the violence reached her home province of El
Quiché in the seventies and intensified into the early eighties, “during all this time”
Menchú recalls, “we couldn’t celebrate our culture; none of our ceremonies” (107). This
led to a profound state of anxiety for Menchú “because the concept our ancestors had was
that our race must not die out and we must follow our traditions and customs as they did”
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(223). This concern with the ability to practice everyday customs is a principal (albeit
overwhelmingly under-explored) theme of her narrative. She says, again: “I was very
concerned that everything handed down from our ancestors should still be practiced”
(149) because they provide a contextual dimension to experience, which in effect, makes
experiences meaningful.
Marriage, birth, and death ceremonies, to illustrate the point, were instrumental in
carrying on meaningful Mayan practices as cultural and historical referents. The birth
ceremonies, for instance, are a time “to remind [children] that our ancestors were
dishonored by the white man, by colonization. But they [the communal parents] don’t tell
them the way that it’s written in books, because the majority of Indians can’t read or
write, and don’t even know that they have their own texts. No, they learn it through oral
recommendations, the way it has been handed down through the generations (13). Books
can be burned, destroyed, limestone codices toppled, but oral narrative practices need
only be encoded in the memory, a device kept alive through reengaging narratives in the
course of everyday practical encounters, including cyclical ritual observances. Menchú
explains these latter practices serve a dual function, not only to pass prescriptive
information along, but “also [as] something of a criticism of humanity, and the many
people who have forsaken their traditions” (12). Henceforth, to be an Indian in a
recognizable way is to partake in the many shared forms of practical understanding
carried forth by ancestral teachings. This is why the death ceremonies are of particular
importance. Menchú notes, an Indian, “at the moment he is going to die…makes his last
recommendations [to their community]…and at the same time gives them the secret of
their ancestors, their own experiences, their reflections. He tells them his secrets…that is,
everything that is handed down through the generations to preserve Indian culture” (201).
Yet since the war began “[death] rituals cannot be performed for a dying person in the
mountains where conditions make it difficult” (203), all leading to a violent disruption of
centrifugal points of cultural reference. The eruption of seismic conditions in worlddefining practices induced survivalist responses from Menchú’s people; their objectives
therefore turned from sustaining levels of normalcy in daily life, in spite of turbulent
conditions, to a new code: First, preserve life, preserve customs only if the former is
attained. Thus, as Menchú tells it, the heart-rendering decision came down from her
community: “we would forget our customs, our ceremonies, for a while, and plan our
security first” (125). She follows: “we broke with many of our cultural procedures by
doing this, but we knew it was the only way to save ourselves” (128).
The aim of her struggle against ‘oppression,’ then, can be seen as even more
elemental than a war against political repression, of respite from material violence. No,
“We wanted change so that we could express our feelings and conduct our ceremonies
again the way we used to, because at the time there was no possibility of doing so” (155).
Without these ceremonies, the Mayans would live, but they would not survive beyond the
present generation. That is, the survivors encoded with Mayan ‘bloodlines’ would no
longer be what it means to be a Mayan Indian. The notion of personal identity based on
‘blood’ and spatial “origin,” to recall, came with the conceptual framework of the
European Spaniards, and was not endemic to Mayan culture. Even their priestly cast
systems and ancient royal bloodlines were determined by a multiplicity of factors
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commensurate with what it meant to be of royal origin; erudite knowledge of ancestral
heritage, the ability to recite traditional prayers, to accurately predict droughts foretold by
astronomical calendars, interpret astral signs, eat the foods of the Royals, or even perform
timely acts of self-bleeding and self-sacrifice. Unlike the Spaniard’s system of identity
classification, one could easily become not-of-royal-blood in the Mayan world.

With regards to the under-explored “theme,” to use literary terms, of everyday
customs in her narrative, several ‘political’ analyses of the text have tended to focus
instead on Menchú’s articulation of material conditions of strife. For example,“[the
kingdom of god] will exist only when we all have enough to eat (134), is frequently cited
in studies of Menchú’s ‘testimonio’; it is also commonly appended to her proclamation:
“[I’ve] been radicalized by the malnutrition which I, as an Indian, have seen and
experienced. And by the exploitation and discrimination which I’ve felt in the flesh”
(247). The succeeding lines are all too often omitted from citation: “and by the
oppression which prevents us from performing our ceremonies, and shows no respect for
our way of life, the way we are”(ibid).
The ramifications of not integrating Menchú’s concern for listening to “the way
we are” can prove far reaching, especially in constructing an adequate answer to the
question, ‘what is to be our response,’ or, put otherwise, ‘how can we help?’. Because
one tends to hear what one is already used to hearing, when formulating a response to
Menchú from the North, the ear of the disciplinary paradigm one is accustomed to
hearing with often prevails. This is to say, if the theoretical framework one has grown
into privileges a hermeneutics based on material economic conditions, as in classical
Marxism, or in empirically verifiable, objective ‘truth’, as in journalism, such will be the
fate of the narrative that is being appropriated—the lines according to which what is
being said, will actually be heard.
To be fair, listening for something other than what one is used to hearing (i.e. for
the unsaid rather than the Said) is a relatively difficult endeavor, particularly when even
close readings of texts seem to point one along a familiar, well-worn path. For instance,
the most typical way Menchú’s text has been read prior to the Stoll controversy—
which we will develop in a moment— is through the conjunctive paradigm of literature
and politics (especially Marxism). Critics such as Beverley attempted to construct a
working definition for the classification of Menchú’s narrative as testimonio, “a new
form of narrative literature in which we can at the same time witness and be a part of
the emerging culture of an international proletarian/popular-democratic subject in its
period of ascendancy.”58Beverley continues:
“Testimonio is implicitly or explicitly…“resistance literature”… The complicity
a testimonio establishes with its readers involves their identification—by engaging their
sense of ethics and justice—with a popular cause normally distant, not to say alien, from
their immediate experience. Testimonio in this sense has been important in maintaining
and developing the practice of international human rights and solidarity movements. It is
also a way of putting on the agenda, within a given country, problems of poverty and
oppression.”59
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Consider how Beverley might have easily arrived at such conclusions (and
justifiably so, since there is no single, monolithic or ‘right’ way to hear her narrative); “I
was fighting for a people and for many children who hadn’t anything to eat” (224),
Menchú declares. Her struggle “is a struggle of hunger and poverty…neither the
government or imperialism can say: ‘Don’t be hungry,’ when we are all dying of hunger’
(135). Moreover, an analysis of the narrative based on reading for material, exploitative
conditions that exacerbate violence is not at all without merit; Menchú often interjects
that “people die early because of the conditions we live in” (144). She gives the following
illustration:
“we [Indians] sleep in the same clothes we work in. that’s why society rejects us.
Me, I felt this rejection very personally, deep inside me. They say we Indians are dirty,
but it’s our circumstances which force us to be like that” (48).

In addition, she goes on to say, “it was not only now that we were being killed;
they had been killing us since we were children, through malnutrition, hunger, poverty,”
(116) which led her to make the aforementioned remark: “[the kingdom of god] will exist
only when we all have enough to eat, when our children, brothers, parents don’t have to
die from hunger and malnutrition” (134). Regarding the Indians who died in the
occupation of the Spanish embassy (her father included), Menchú explains: “all they
wanted was enough to live on” (185). And so throughout her narrative she comes back to,
again and again, the insistence on the subjugating nature of material conditions: “as I
said, and I say it again, it is not fate which makes us poor” (133).
To be sure, Menchú’s assertion that “our dedication to the struggle is a reaction
against it, against all the suffering we endure” (203) evokes a certain sense of continual
physical strife, but it is due to the aggregate effect the repetition of “hunger” and
“poverty” have on the reader since these are all concrete, already-recognizable ways of
conceptualizing ‘suffering’. The reader expects a sense of “desperation” to follow, and so
one reads for that: “What were we to do?,” she says, “this made me very angry and I
asked myself what else could we do in life? I couldn’t see any way of avoiding living as
everyone else did, and suffering like they did. I was very anxious” (89). Menchú then
recalls the time she said, “Mother, I don’t want to live, why didn’t I die when I was little?
How can we go on living?” (ibid) Yet in these latter passages the connotation is not just
the endurance of physical suffering, but the absence of traditional points of reference for
living that ground existence— habits that instill a sense of normalcy and levity (in that
one forgets what one is doing at the present moment and by virtue of that acts
effortlessly). In the wake of this dis-orientation, one is suddenly aroused to what is
actually going on around one, with the disorientation giving way to “anxiety”. “I had lost
my energy with all the worries I’d had…everything was piling up together: it was all on
top of me” (239), she says. If we selectively point to the parts of her narrative that fit preconceived articulations of the testimonial genre, such as the narrative of hunger alone,
perhaps the call to hear how one is what one is—the things that make up Indian identity
and therefore must be preserved—can be lost, falling in deaf ears. She almost needs to
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shout it: “why don’t outsiders accept Indian ways? This is where discrimination lies!”
(122).
It is crucial to be able to see how reading a narrative without a contextual
backdrop of preexisting socio-historical relations obfuscates the way in which the
narrator relates to herself, that is to say, how one produces meaningful patterns of
association, as in what it means to be ‘Indian’. An ‘outsider’ to this pre-existing nexus of
relations in a culture will not be able to “accept Indian ways” because they will not even
know to look for the differences which constitute “Indian ways”, meaning their
understanding of “difference” is already construed as something intelligible, notuncanny, and manageable enough to weave effortlessly as a representative image of the
native in academic debates and papers. If we actually understood the native as different,
we would begin to talk about her by becoming silent.
Another prime example of how ‘outsiders’ have constructed intelligible accounts
of the ‘way of the native,’— i.e. as what the native actually means to say or do— is
through Menchú’s account of “secrets”. It is a difficult critique to embark upon, mainly
due to the impeccable research methods and analytic rigor of the critics from whom they
emanate, such as the Harvard literary critic, Doris Sommer—whose metacritical breadth
is admirable, if not beyond reproach. Yet it can be of significant value to show how easy
it is for Western interlocutors to listen selectively (because, to remember, the hermeneutic
situation is inextricable from what it means to be human—even for myself) for the
already-familiar. By offering an instantiation of the interpretive instinct by even the most
self-critical of academics, it is possible to deflate in advance many of David Stoll’s
vitriolic attacks on Menchú’s text (insofar as they are symptoms of one particular way of
looking at the world).
In her article “No Secrets for Rigoberta” and in a later expanded version, “Las
Casas’s Lies and Other Language Games,” Doris Sommer argues Menchú’s use of
“secrets” in her narrative is a “rhetorical technique” aimed at “keeping readers from
knowing her too well”; it is a “decidedly fictional performance” on Menchú’s part, an
intentional ruse deployed so that “she keeps reminding readers that we are too foreign to
presume to analyze her world, certainly too ill-informed to solve its problems…[it is]
Rigoberta’s game of distancing readers to a point from which they cannot possibly offer
advice”.60 She continues:
“keeping secrets is her most significant language game, I believe. Rigoberta
Menchú’s secrets astonished me when I read her testimonial in the early 1980s.Her
secrets stopped me then, and instruct me now, whatever the validity of the information or
the authenticity of the informant. Why should she make so much of keeping secrets
instead of just keeping quiet? I wondered. And why do these cultural secrets matter, if
they have no apparent military or strategic value in this denunciation of Indian removal
politics in Guatemala? Here is an expose that refuses to share information. The
dissonance raised a question about Rigoberta:…was she being coy on the witness stand,
excercising control over apparently irrelevant information, perhaps to produce her own
strategic version of the truth?”61
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And yet, as mentioned earlier, if we carry forth an understanding of I, Rigoberta
Menchú as a narrative produced always in the wake of a breakdown in context— of a
collapse of worldhood from the colonial encounter onwards— then in our reading of
Menchú’s narrative another interpretation of Menchú’s “secrets” can emerge, one that
discounts the image of a ‘coy Rigoberta’. Firstly, Menchú’s ‘secrets’ are not a rhetorical
device to captivate the reader; no, through ‘secrets’ Menchú is recording the history of a
culture on the verge of extinction— hence her insistence on talking about everyday
cultural practices that preserve the Mayan worldview. Moreover, with the situation
growing worse by the moment, she must do this by any means necessary, including
utilizing foreign networks of expressions which are almost certain to distort the message.
Sommer is right in that Mayans keep secrets from ‘outsiders’:
“We have hidden our identity because we needed to resist, we wanted to protect
what governments have wanted to take away from us. They have tried to take our things
away and impose others on us, be it through religion, through dividing up the land,
through schools…through all things modern” (171).

“And this is why Indians are thought to be stupid” says Menchú “they can’t think, they
don’t know anything, they say” (ibid). But Sommer’s claim secrets “have no apparent
military or strategic value in this denunciation of Indian removal politics in Guatemala,” I
think, is misbegotten; it has everything to do with the denunciation. As we shall see
momentarily, without the violence enacted upon the Mayans on behalf of ‘Indan-removal
politics’, there would be no need to talk about “secrets”. This is because by “secrets”
Menchú is talking about customs, about everyday practical knowledge: it is not, as
Sommer contends, a rhetorical “method” on Menchú’s part. Rather, it is a type of recipe,
if you will, or instruction booklet for everyday Mayan cultural practices and values.
Without these guidelines, the center of Mayan life begins to loosen. Keeping secrets,
Menchú tells,
“is part of the reserve that we’ve maintained to defend our customs and our
culture. Indians have been very careful not to disclose any details of their communities,
and the community does not allow them to talk about Indian things. I too must abide by
this. This is because many religious people have come among us and drawn a false
impression of the Indian world…All this has meant that we kept a lot of things to
ourselves and the community doesn’t like us telling its secrets. This applies to all our
customs”(9, emphasis mine).

Yet Sommer does not account for how, just a few sentences after this defensive
litany by Menchú, she inexplicably resumes telling the detailed narratives of her
customs…“anyways,” she says, calling attention to the above digression, “when a baby is
born…” such and such a thing is done, offering chapter-long details of the meaning of
practical minutiae; why red strings are used to tie a newborn’s hands; why male boys
have an extra day alone with the mother; why so-and-so must be present, and what that
signifies, etc. Menchú, after emphasizing the oath to secrecy that “applies to all our
customs” and applies to her as well, goes on to explicate in novella-length detail many of
her culture’s most important practices. As an alternate explanation, I believe she is being
wholly consistent with the contextual framework from which she narrates; in other
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words, she is simply fulfilling her responsibility to keep ancestral teachings alive:
“again, this is all bound up with our commitment to maintain our customs and pass on the
secrets of our ancestors…we must conserve them” (17), she says. Since the beginning,
when a child is born, “[the communal parents] promise to teach the child to keep the
secrets of our people, so that our culture and customs will be preserved” (12). By
‘preserve’ she means to keep out of view from those capable of taking their culture away:
Historically, Spaniards, and now, Ladinos and non-Indian elites. Earlier on, the subject of
historical memory arose. The raze-and-burn cultural policy of the Spaniard colonizers left
a lasting impression on Mayan historical memory; the lesson learned: no one can steal
what cannot be found, or even more, what no one knows to look for. To survive, the
Mayans learned to speak by concealing:
“My father used to say ‘there are many secrets we must not tell. We must keep
our secrets’. He said no rich man, no landowner, no priest or nun, must ever know our
secrets. If we don’t protect our ancestor’s secrets, we’ll be responsible for killing them”
(188).

The phrase “we’ll be responsible for killing them” could not be more appropriate;
for if what it means to be a Mayan Indian is embodied in their cultural practices, their
linguistic resources, their costumes, if those resources of expression are taken away an
Indian is no longer that; to go back to an earlier statement: “there are Indians who don’t
wear Indian clothes and have forgotten their languages, so they are not considered
Indians” (167). To combat this possibility, “the village leaders come and offer their
experience, their example, and their knowledge of our ancestors. They explain how to
preserve traditions” (12). Growing up, Menchú recalls the lessons of her parents, the
insistence that “it is our duty as parents to keep our secrets safe generation after
generation, to prevent the ladinos learning anything of our ancestors’ ways” (68). It was,
after all, the Western Christian civilizing mission that brought on the need for secrets.
This is why “we don’t perform only Christian ceremonies. We don’t want to because we
know that they are weapons they use to take away what is ours” (171), she explains. The
memory of colonialism heeds a powerful warning to all Mayans; “we must not trust
them, white men are all thieves. We must keep our secrets from them,” say the Mayan
elders (69).
As seen, Sommer’s claim that Menchú’s use of “secrets” is purely “rhetorical”
can be contrasted with a different account of her narrative. Throughout several points
Menchú openly reveals (though the message falls between the ‘gaps’) what she means,
specifically, by each ‘secret’: “We have our secrets,” she says, “My mother had many
little secrets that she taught us, just small things. For instance, what to do when a lot of
dogs are barking or biting someone” (190). Being able to calm a disruptive animal is
important practical knowledge in her community given, as Menchú tells it, the
regimented and limited sleep patterns of working Mayans; one only has a couple hours to
sleep before returning to work in the plantations, so being woken by animals, she tells,
would be injurious to their daily routines. She divulges another little secret:
“It was the community who taught me to respect all the things which must
remain secret as long as we exist, and which future generations will keep secret…when
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we began to organize ourselves, we started by using all the things we’d kept hidden—our
traps—nobody knew about them because they’d been kept secret (139).

Developing methods of self-defense, organizing the community in a clandestine
matter was essential; if the military got wind of the mobilization of highland Mayans in
El Quiché, the implications would be life-threatening. That is why “no one must discover
our community’s secret…it’s a secret what we are doing here”(125). To escape detection
of soldiers, it was the “organization” of the village which “was totally secret,” the
“network of information” the village had put into operation (128) became a secret— a
way of being ‘discreet’ that ensured their survival. There is no ‘coyness’ in this
understanding of secrets, as Sommer suggests. In fact, when Menchú’s village outsmarted
several soldiers, she recalls: “I said: ‘This is a great victory for our secrets, no-one has
discovered them” (147).
But the question must be asked again: if one cannot perform ceremonies due to
erupting violent conditions, how is Menchú’s culture to survive? How is the knowledge
to be passed on without applied practices? The question of whether to reveal ‘secrets’ or
not is mimicked in an earlier decision, a pattern being woven under the surface. To recall
that painful decision: “we would forget our customs, our ceremonies, for a while, and
plan our security first” …“we broke with many of our cultural procedures by doing this,
but we knew it was the only way to save ourselves” (125, 128). Hence the following:
“and so we have to protect our lives, we are ready to defend them [our lives, as in our
ancestors] even if it means revealing our secrets.” (170). In the wake of a breakdown in
context, the rules of the game have changed, yet the nexus of relations—the sociohistorical context that produced the conditions in which the ‘game’ emerged— does not.
Menchú still understands herself as the self she grew into an understanding of; as a
product of an ancestral community commended with the task of preserving one’s own
way of life. Thus, in the midst of ( yet another) genocide “we had to prevail over these
times through the living memory of our ancestors” (187). And it is through the living
memory of her ancestors that Menchú speaks, the way she is most at home in speaking,
when asked to give her ‘testimony’: “I was asked to give my testimony about the
situation in Guatemala,” she recounts, and that is exactly what she did. She explained
‘the situation’ by narrating how it is her people’s world was dissolving; how Mayans
were being exterminated by more than the current military regime, but also by the
structural conditions underpinning it. For the “violence” to end, the latter must be brought
out of concealment. This is what it means to denounce the regime and all that supports its
very existence.
An interesting claim Sommer makes, however, focuses on another aspect of
Menchú’s narrative; the author-editor function played by the ethnologist who
interviewed, tape-recorded, and compiled Menchú’s narrative into a ‘text’. Sommer
writes:
“we should notice that the audible protests of silence [the secrets] are responses
to anthropologist Elisabeth Burgos-Debray’s line of questioning. If she were not asking
possibly impertinent questions, the Quiché informant would have no reason to resist”.62

And yet I’m not so sure Menchú is resisting. Burgos-Debray would have to
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have been asking nothing but impertinent questions in order to maintain the level of
repetitive, cyclical continuity evidenced in Menchú’s verbalization of “secrets.” To call
up the original frustration Burgos-Debray’s expresses in the introduction to I, Rigoberta
Menchú, her narrative subject seemed bent on talking about marriage ceremonies, rituals,
and customs rather than sticking to the assigned teleological outline suggested by BurgosDebray. Yet Menchú’s actions here are not to be interpreted as purposeful ‘digressions’, à
la Sommer, intent on derailing the ethnologist’s project; Menchú simply has a different
conception of a telos: for her, projecting into the future means a simultaneous reaching
back—a sliding to and fro in order to talk about the present. This is why, to begin,
Menchú expresses her desire to begin in (what she recognizes for the European
ethnographer to be) an unorthodox manner: “I’d like to start from when I was a little girl,
or go back even further to when I was in my mother’s womb” (1).
For Sommer, the appearance of withholding secrets “surely infuriates some
traditional anthropologists. Perhaps they are deaf to the message of propriety, or they feel
goaded to know more than she will tell”63 But is the message propriety? Because I am not
Indian, I cannot say whether the alternative explanation I offer is any closer to what
Menchú means to say. Following Nietzsche, I too might be replacing one fiction for
another. But I, like Sommer, believe in arriving at our conclusions by taking very careful
looks at the stories we study. She is apt to point out members of certain scientific
communities will be jarred by the dissonance created in reading Menchú’s text; where we
differ is in the conclusion—for me, the effect is not one created purposefully by Menchú
in order to create distance, but rather is the result of how the Western interlocutor
interprets her discursive attempts as distancing. To this end, the “appearance” of
‘withholding secrets’ does, in fact, exist, but only for us. To ask Menchú to answer to this
ploy, this ingenious ruse, could also be to say to Menchú that we haven’t heard her at all,
that we’ve been listening to ourselves instead. In spite of this, Sommer’s reading of
Menchú’s narrative is highly complementary to my own, since it develops possible layers
unconcealed by different interpretations, different ways of seeing what ostensibly appears
to be the same thing, as in the canonical understanding of a text as a ‘fixed’ object. In
looking at the theme of “secrets” in this manner, we realize that as interpreters we can
often come through different avenues, melodies, and ways to share in the same coda;
Sommer’s concludes her analysis of Menchú’s narrative by asserting what I, too, would
affirm. In response to reading Menchú, She writes:
“It is a lesson in the distinction between giving support and giving orders.
Readers may feel moved to lobby against military aid to a cruel regime, perhaps to send
medical supplies or food, and to reflect on the long history of slippages between wanting
to know Indians and thinking you know enough to make policy for them.64

To give Menchú the last word:
“We Indians have always hidden our identity and kept our secrets to ourselves.
This is why we are discriminated against”…“we often find it hard to talk about ourselves
because we know we must hide so much in order to preserve our Indian culture and
prevent it being taken away from us.” [but] “we can select what is truly relevant for our
people. Our lives show us what this is. It has guaranteed our existence. Otherwise we
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would not have survived… we have selected what is relevant for us and have fought for this”…
“we don’t do this or that so our neighbors can say, what good people they are! We do it
for our ancestors” (21,170,187, emphasis added).

“We do it for our ancestors,” henceforth, becomes the navigational compass for
action—the prescriptive orientation coming down from her tradition; it is a view of
agency fundamentally rooted in directing one’s possible future actions through a
synchronized retrieval of pre-existing traditions and cultural relations. Put in other words,
for the Mayan subaltern speaker to talk explicitly about the future is to always speak
implicitly about colonialism, about the narrative that makes possible an understanding of
the current violence as inherently not-of-one’s making. This is why she speaks about the
military violence as derivative of an older situational matrix: “our situation has nothing
do with fate but was something which had been imposed on us” (119), she says; “if you
think about it, Spain has a lot to do with our situation. They have a lot to do with the
origins of the suffering of the people, especially of the Indians” (186). To ask a Mayan
Indian to try to be “objective” about the ‘actual’ situation in Guatemala during the 1970s
and 1980s (that is, to try to give an account of history which paints the government and
Ladino elites in a other way than as ‘oppressor’) is to denude Mayans of lived experience,
of their sedimented, protestational stance towards official history.
Keep in mind, Menchú believes she is being asked to speak about the plight of her
people, about the suffering of indigenous communities in Guatemala. Even when her
Western interlocutor chooses to hear for palpable narratives of hunger and material strife,
Menchú points the way towards an understanding of her narrative that is “aggregative
rather than analytic”65; in other words, as a privileging of the sum total, of the effect
produced by pointing to passages the same way a flame passes candle to candle, gaining
luminary value with each new descriptive flicker. In light of the rampart “malnutrition,
hunger, poverty” faced by her people, she tells, “we started thinking about the roots of the
problem and came to the conclusion that everything stemmed from the ownership of the
land”(116). To the economically-deterministic ear, being able to ground the problem
faced by indigenous peoples on “ownership of the land,” of having control of the means
of production, is not misguided, nor without precedent. But the point remains that for
Menchú this problem is rooted in an even older condition produced by coloniality:
“[the elders] refer back to the time of Columbus and say: ‘Our forefathers were
dishonored by the White Man—sinners and murders; and it is not the fault of our
ancestors…if they hadn’t come, we would all be united, equal, and our children would
not suffer. We would not have boundaries to our land” (67).

If “the White Man” had not arrived, for the Mayans, land ownership would still be
understood as communal property, collectivized, and remain un-divided; by having
“boundaries” to their land, Menchú is referring to the phenomenon of parceling out
measurable plots of land, first by colonial administrators, and subsequently by the
Guatemalan government. For this reason, Menchú explains, the most important form of
communal education after the teaching of daily customs and practices is a historical
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education; being an ‘educated’ Indian has nothing to do with schooling in humanistic
knowledge, but with having a sense of one’s own history. She narrates:
“I was now an educated woman. Not in the sense of any schooling and even less
in the sense of being well-read. But I knew the history of my people, and the history of my
companeros from other [Mayan] ethnic groups” (169).

This is what it means to ‘have knowledge’, to bring forward a collective, social
autobiography written by a long lineage of communal experiences and ways of
interpreting those experiences. Since the beginning, she tells, “[newborns] are told that
the Spaniards dishonored our ancestors’ finest sons, and the most humble of them. And it
is to honor these humble people that we must keep our secrets”(13). In the marriage rites,
she makes a point to emphasize the community elders always “say: ‘This is what our
ancestors were like; this is what the White Man did; it’s the fault of the White Man…who
is to blame for all this? The White Man who came to our country” (69).
As we have seen, being able to grasp (and by ‘grasp’ I mean becoming
continually aware of) the contextual, historical framework operative in narratological
practices of Mayan Indians is imperative on many levels. First, it neutralizes the
positivist-minded social-scientist’s project of trying to establish a ‘more objective’
historical referent for indigenous peoples outside of their own. The very idea of helping
indigenous peoples cope with their situation by helping them ‘get clear’ on what are
fundamentally Western ways of looking at historical events will not lead to “genuine”
pathways for communication, but to exacerbating the sentiment that one is not being
heard across the border (s). Secondly, what official colonial constructions of history do is
facilitate the maintenance of the colonial condition by reproducing the illusion of a
neutral, value-free perspective that is always privileged over indigenous, ‘biased’
perspectives. It instills a formal grounding, a sense of predictability-- of the ability to
exercise control over flux by falling in line with linear narrative structures (facilitated by
subject-predicate grammar). Official colonial history and the language of empirical
science work in conjunction to re-conceal the Mayan’s lived understanding of the world
as a historical breakdown, a collapse, as we have said earlier, of ‘worldhood’.
Specifically, the Stoll-Menchú controversy covers over this world-defining
collapse by engaging textual interpretation of Indian “testimonies of survival” based
solely on the Western interpreter’s own criterion for credibility. In so doing so, the
controversy reproduces certain Western cultural conventions rooted in a naturalistic
ontology by devaluing indigenous worldviews based on human practices. I take the
anthropologist Victoria Sanford’s advocacy of reading Menchú’s narrative through a
“meaning-centered” interpretive method one step further. She writes:
Survivor testimonies viewed in the context of the discourse and practice of the
various phases of state terror…represent a living memory of the terror that continues to
influence daily life. Under these circumstances, discrepancies encountered in testimonies
taken in the field should not be taken to indicate faulty memory, invention, or deception.
Rather these contradictions should ‘lead us through and beyond facts to their meaning”
as experienced by survivors and witnesses’”66 (emphasis mine).
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On this view, I suggest that the alleged ‘in-itself’ existence of the abovementioned “discrepancies” in Menchú’s narrative ‘exist’ only on culturally normativistic
grounds. That is to say, Sanford’s references to these contradictions and discrepancies
exist only when testimonies are read from a Western perspective.
For example, in the West, lived experience is filtered though an understanding of
self as a relation between subjects and objects commensurate with a naturalistic
ontology. Presently, and for some time now since the arrival of post-seventeenth century
scientific thinking (ushered in by the likes of Newton, Copernicus, and Brahe), we have
subscribed to a conception of the world that is purely scientific, one that holds up the
structure and content of the world as solely governed by natural law. Historically, the
overwhelming successes of modern science in rationally predicting, manipulating, and
empirically verifying the existence of the external world though regimented calculability
and standardized experimentation have led to a distinctively naturalistic account of
human knowledge, one where objective science, not human practice, is the measure of all
things. Scientific naturalism, in particular, undervalues the foundational role human
construction of standards underlying our world play in our knowledge of the world,
where world is seen as a historical paradigm.67
Over time, naturalism has become synonymous with a reductivist non-normative
account of the world that is purely scientific, one mired in objectivity and philosophically
committed to the physical world as fundamentally knowable. The social sciences and
particularly the research methods of modern anthropology and ethnography are prime
examples of this positivist bias. Thus, when David Stoll defends his research of
uncovering possible lies told by Menchú, he credits his project to the foundational need
to “differentiate truth from falsehood” in defense of “the scientific spirit”.68
Moreover, this insistence on factual veracity is precisely why phenomenological
reading practices pose threats to the totalizing, overarching influence of scientific
naturalism in textual interpretation—because phenomenological approaches disclose the
authority justifying many of scientific naturalism’s claims as relative; that is to say, they
are based on a self-reflexive commitment to a picture of “science” that is
paradigmatically modern and arose from the “great successes” of post-seventeenth
century scientific thought. In other words, naturalism is deeply rooted in certain
historical trajectories descendant from the European Enlightenment; it is an atomistic
viewpoint which, when grafted onto Mayan worldviews, masters over and conceals the
role of human agency in indigenous ontologies. For example, when modern Mayans
attempt to speak, what shows up to the Western listener, then, are “inconsistencies” and
“contradictions” which are reclassified as “falsehoods,” “lies”. Saying “Rigoberta lied” is
also to say we don’t understand what she is saying as something worth valuing, that is,
we don’t recognize the Morse code she is sending us because it is not encoded through
our language of empiricism, and is subsequently discarded. Thus, despite offering
insightful alternatives as to how ‘discrepancies’ and ‘contradictions’ in survivor
testimonies could be interpreted differently, Sanford still holds on to the assumption that
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the contradictions do, in fact, exist in themselves, rather than challenging them
structurally by examining how such ‘discrepancies’ exist for us.69
Thus, it is important, if not crucial, to begin to rethink the accepted
“discrepancies” and “contradictions” perceived to be in Menchú’s narrative as products
of Western cultural normative practices. Finally, let us now turn to the controversy itself,
fleshing out its parameters so as to move past them; this, in an effort to hear Menchú on
her own terms— a task which is always unfinished, on-the-way, and towards which we
must continually reach. There is no ‘getting it right’ with regards to interpreting
Menchú’s narrative because reading practices are invariably framed through the reader’s
own particular conceptual framework. However, when seen as an event, by taking the
stance of repetition (that is, continuously reengaging the act of trying to hear anew) we
may create through our practices certain conditions favorable to equitable discourse
between culturally different agents.

39

CHAPTER THREE
BEARING TRUTHFUL WITNESS: DAVID STOLL AND THE STORY
OF ALL POOR GUATEMALANS

After receiving a “tip” from an American anthropologist claiming to be in
possession of corroborative evidence for his allegations (i.e., the academic book he had
just written), on December 15th, 1998, the prestigious New York Times ran a front-page
article headlined by “Nobel Winner Finds Her Story Challenged” in reference to
Rigoberta Menchú. The controversy was this: the American anthropologist in question
seemed to have found evidence of contradictions in Menchú’s testimony, thereby
suggesting it should be impeached based on her now-tarnished credibility. The article,
written by one of the paper’s top Central American correspondents, Larry Rohter, was
quickly picked up by the international press and reprinted the next morning as “Tarnished
Laureate.”70 Rohter writes:
“Key details of [Menchú’s] story… are untrue, according to a new book written
by an American anthropologist, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor
Guatemalans. Based on nearly a decade of interviews with more than 120 people and
archival research, the anthropologist, David Stoll, concludes that Ms. Menchú’s book
“cannot be the eyewitness account it purports to be” because the Nobel laureate
repeatedly describes “experiences she never had herself””71.

Having framed the polemic on the reliability of first person eye-witness testimony
to report only what one has borne witness to (versus hearsay), Rohter’s article went on to
reproduce Stoll’s major assertions, all of which center on a direct contestation of
Menchú’s “version of the facts.” According to Stoll, Menchú (whom he only refers to as
Rigoberta) misrepresents the “situation of her family and village life before the war”72 in
an effort to fall in line with the revolutionary ideology of the EGP, a militant peasant
organization.
Based on interviews and archival field work, Stoll claims the following: (1)
Menchú’s brother Nicolas did not die of intoxication from pesticide fumes, as she claims
in her narrative, but of simple malnutrition; (2) the land dispute Menchú alludes to was
not between “evil” Ladino elite landowners but a paltry quarrel over land between her
father, Vicente, and another Mayan neighbor; (3) Menchú’s Father, who died during the
occupation of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala, served as the instigator for the
skirmish between the peasants and the army, immolated himself, and may even have been
personally responsible for the fire; (4) Menchú lied about being an illiterate peasant who
could not write or speak Spanish; based on conversations with Belgian nuns in the region
who remember Menchú, Stoll claims Menchú attended a prestigious boarding school on
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an academic scholarship, knew Spanish, how to write, and did not engage in manual
labor in the fincas given her full-time enrollment in school. The nuns do not have records
to prove this, but he believes them; (5) Stoll claims her brother, Petrochino, was not
burned alive by the military, as she depicts in her narrative, but rather shot by the military
and dumped in a common mass grave.73For Stoll, these are all inconsistencies that matter
because he claims they reveal a deeper revolutionary “agenda” to cover over “what
cannot be corroborated” in order to put forth propagandist versions of the facts as the one
“official story”. In response to the allegations of filtering ‘the truth’ to fit an ideological
“agenda”, Menchú countered in a Janurary 1999 interview in La Prensa Libre:
“There is no hidden agenda. Some people think that I have a hidden agenda, a
hidden truth, and that therefore they must bring out that truth. Today I can tell you all
these things because nobody will be assassinated tomorrow because of it.”74

Stoll’s overarching argument in Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor
Guatemalans discredits Menchú’s detailed descriptions of the state-sponsored terror in
Guatemala as historically “inaccurate”. He contends “Rigoberta’s version was so
attractive to so many foreigners that Mayans who repudiated the guerillas were often
ignored or discounted”75. Stoll includes himself in the people “ignored or discounted” in
the wake of worldwide attention focused on Menchú’s narrative. For instance, Stoll’s
‘expert’ assessment—which he had articulated years earlier in his Stanford doctoral
dissertation but according to him went “unnoticed” in the “politically correct” academic
world owing to the “fashionable popularity” of Menchú’s book— points blame for the
violence at guerilla insurgents. Had the guerillas, many of whom were Mayans
themselves, not instigated violence against the armed forces, Stoll suggests, perhaps
Mayans would not have faced the same level of repression from the military. In other
words, since hypothetically speaking Mayan insurgents could have acted differently,
perhaps rebelling against the Guerillas who were fueling the violence (in his view), the
massacres of Mayans could have been avoided. In fact, the massacres of Mayan Indians
were a result, in his expert opinion, of a ‘crossfire’ between radicalized insurgents lulled
by the romanticism of ‘Guevarismo’ and a predictable ‘anti-terrorist’ response by the
state.
Not surprisingly, Stoll’s controversial conclusion “brutality toward civilians is a
predictable result”76from insurrectional activity taken against a repressive government
did not make it into the New York Times article, for it places blame on victims of
violence for rebelling against their oppressors. Stoll discredits the assertion made by
Menchú, as well as by prominent historians of Central America, that guerilla groups
formed in response to state repression. Although Menchú’s side of the story is echoed by
United Nations reports, citing the army for “over 95 percent of the killings,”77Stoll
contends revolutionary groups like the EGP (Ejército Guerrillero do los Pobres) [Guerilla
Army of the Poor] played a foundational role in the violence. The ‘controversy,’ hence,
is between contrasting versions of the same events; one from the victim (Menchú) who
lived though the ‘terror’ and holds the military to blame, versus that of the professional
academic (Stoll) who considers himself a neutral “scientist,” and points the finger in the
other direction, towards tensions caused by insurgencies from rebel forces, such as the
predominantly indigenous EGP.
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In interviews following the publication of Rohter’s article, Stoll reiterated his
position that Menchú’s narrative became canonized in the 1980s by well-meaning leftist
intellectuals as part of a “concerted effort to construct an international human rights
imaginary” – in reference to the work of John Beverley, whom Stoll cites as “an expert in
testimonio”—that is “sacred” and beyond question”78. He says, “I wanted to encourage
more survivors to share their experiences of violence”79 without mentioning why in his
book he only offers accounts of the violence which, after being selectively compiled,
bolster his own argument, discounting any which might corroborate Menchú’s account.
In a February 1999 interview with Dina Garcia, Stoll adds, “when a book
becomes almost sacred, it is a sign that it hides contradictions that ought to see the light
of day.”80 What Stoll meant by a book becoming “almost sacred” is this: by the time
Menchú received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992 for “her tireless defense of indigenous
rights and peoples,” her 1983 narrative denouncing the violence in Guatemala had
already been translated into half a dozen languages, placed on the multicultural reading
lists of many university syllabi, and become an international best-seller. And, although
the Nobel Prize committee responded to Rohter’s article by reminding the international
audience that the prize awarded was “for peace, not literature,” many critics claimed her
“autobiography’s” prominence “paved the way for her being awarded the Nobel Prize”.81
In spite of this, in the introduction to his book, Stoll makes the rhetorical assertion that if
the Nobel Prize resulted (whether directly or indirectly) from the international success
Menchú’s narrative had achieved, what would happen, then, “if much of Rigoberta’s
story is not true?” 82
Throughout Latin America, and especially in Guatemala, a bevy of editorial
rejoinders to the Rohter article appeared in newspapers and journals in the days following
the New York Times article publication. In a January 16, 1999 La Jornada editorial
ironically titled “Let’s Shoot Rigoberta,” Eduardo Galeano makes the following remark:
“[Stoll] came to Guatemala to study us as if we were insects…In his book he
invokes witnesses and archives. What archives can there possibly be about the recently
concluded war? Did the Guatemalan army open their archives to him? Not too long ago,
Congressman Barrios Kleé tried to consult those same archives, and he was later found
with a bullet hole in his head.”83

For many close to the situation in Guatemala, one columnist noted,
“the prominence of [Rohter’s] article came as a surprise, because the [New York
Times] had downplayed other significant events that took place in Central America
during 1998, including the assassination in Guatemala of Bishop Juan Gerardi, the head
of the Recovery of Historical Memory commission (REMHI), forty-eight hours after he
presented the printed version of the commission’s human rights document, Guatemala,
Never Again 84.”

Commissioned by the United Nations, the allusion in Bishop Gerardi’s report to
the Jewish holocaust sought to emphasize the worldwide apathetic diffidence towards the
history of a whole people—the Mayan Indians, during the genocidal period in Guatemala.
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The timely reference suggests an ethical quandary over narrative authority. If it is the
case that witnesses of crimes cannot denounce violence firsthand because their voices
have been snuffed out along with their lives, how is a story, one with life-and-death
consequences, to be told? How can official history record the voices of the voiceless
when they are no longer alive to represent themselves? Journalists and forensic
anthropologists may be of valuable aid in reconstructing historical tragedies, particularly
in cases where intensive field work leads to the unearthing of clandestine cemeteries, as
in Victoria Sanford’s work. Yet if influential journalists encapsulate cultural tragedies
by reducing them to allusionial bi-lines, victims will be hard pressed to accept any
official version as an adequate account of their lived experience. For example, by
omitting specific details or even official casualty figures by the United Nations—
200,000 dead, 40,000 ‘disappeared,’ 100,000 orphans, and a million and a half refugees-and simply calling it a “civil war,” Rohter summarized the force of Stoll’s accusations by
noting, “it is necessary for readers ‘to distinguish between what can be corroborated and
what cannot, what is probable and what is highly improbable’.” 85
For Menchú, what stood out as improbable would be the inability of the
international press to corroborate facts from a dead person; in explaining why she gave a
first person account of her brother Petrocinio’s death despite not bearing direct witness to
it, she confides “my mother saw it. And she can no longer speak about it.” Since her
mother suffered the same fate as so many Mayan Indians, Menchú asks: “How could I
possibly have presented my mother as the number one witness, when they have killed so
many witnesses so they can’t speak?”86 Dante Liano has responded to the charges
brought against Menchú by pointing out that
“what we have here is a classic campaign to rewrite history [by Stoll]”…“it calls
to mind the technique used to attack the veracity of the Holocaust survivors: “but you just
said you were in that camp, whereas the documents prove you were in another camp; and
if that concentration camp did not exist, perhaps no concentration camps ever existed at
all”.87

And yet Stoll holds steady in his book to warnings against reliance in different
“perspectives” in first-person testimonial narratives without an “objective mediator” to
test for “accuracy”; if, as academics, we remain steadfast to the idea of critical inquiry,
then we must see to it that Menchú, “a quasi-religious figure,” is “compared to other
forms of evidence”88. For some critics, including renowned anthropologists, this
stressing of neutrality does not sit well in a field keenly aware that documents or “facts”
never speak for themselves, but always need interpreting. What seems to be really at
stake, then, is a debate internal to disciplinary frameworks split between a polarization of
postmodernist pedagogy inclusive of difference versus scientific naturalism’s will
towards a single neutral Truth. Carol Smith writes:
“Objective reportage, according to Stoll, is no longer appreciated in the social
sciences, heavily influenced by literary theory, postmodernity, and general postcolonial
or multicultural uncertainty a bout the trustworthiness of white first-world men.
Witnesses who represent the subaltern—people like Rigoberta—are better sources on the
oppressed and on the meaning of their lives than are outside reporters. This has given
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Rigoberta an “unfair” advantage over Stoll—the objective reporter, just trying to get at the
“truth”.89

Anticipating the possible polemic over interpretive power, Stoll argues in his own
favor in his 1996 article, “To whom should we listen?”.90 According to Stoll, because the
detached, anthropological perspective can help “sort out” prejudicial, biased accounts in
field interviews from more reliable ones, he believes it is essential for native informants
to engage field experts truthfully in order for the informant’s community to have the best
chance of understanding the actual, historical nature of their situation. However, Stoll,
who oddly considers himself a leftward leaning academic, does not blame informants
who cannot (perhaps due to trauma, pressure from outside forces, faulty memory, or even
duress) recount their lived experiences in a truthful manner. Since for Stoll it is only
“natural” for victims of intense violence to lapse into “mythopoetic” accounts of lived
experience, rearranging historical facts along ideologies more sympathetic to “narratives
of victimization,” it becomes doubly important to employ the resources of a detached
interpreter such as himself to help clarify and record official history. This line of
reasoning leads John Beverley to ask whether it is possible “to have a ‘left’ politics with a
‘right’ epistemology,” as he views Stoll’s case to be.91 The literary critic Elizbieta
Sklodowska responds with an even more poignant observation; Stoll’s arguments evoke
such strong opposition from contemporaries because they are at heart anachronistic,
products of an anti-communist, bipolar Cold-War framework that is “oddly out of
place”92 in the late nineties.
For our part it will not be necessary to develop a defense of Menchú’s account
based on evidentiary corroboration of historical documents, as Stoll would perhaps insist
on, for this has been extensively undertaken by field experts in both history and forensic
anthropology. For example, since 1994, Victoria Sanford, a Peace Fellow at the Bunting
Institute and a forensic anthropologist, has headed the exhumations of clandestine
cemeteries in rural Mayan villages in Guatemala, serving as a research consultant to the
Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation for their final report on Mayan casualty
tolls. In “Deconstructing David Stoll’s History of Guatemala,” Sanford offers point by
point documentation, CIA briefs and memorandums, and empirical field evidence
attesting to the Guatemalan military as the culprit of the violence. She also develops
another factor for the war Stoll leaves largely unmentioned: US involvement and
responsibility. Sanford, utilizing Allan Nairn’s research, points to memorandums from
the Unites States embassy in Guatemala to the Secretary of State, telegrams, and
briefings as early as the 1962. She writes:
These documents offer factual and evidentiary corroboration of the context of the
terror provided by the testimonies. A declassified CIA document from late February 1982
states that in mid-February 1982 the Guatemalan army had reinforced its existing forces
and launched “a sweep operation of the Ixil Triangle. The commanding officers of the
units involved have been instructed to destroy all towns and villages which are
cooperating with the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and eliminate all sources of
resistance”93
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On this point, Stoll’s deemphasizing of American involvement in the war struck
many journalists and historians as also questionable, given his persistence on approaching
the ‘facts’ of what “actually happened”. Journalist Margarita Carrera redirects attention to
human rights reports which confirm
“how the Guatemalan government was at the service of capitalist interests and
defended by the army (which received its orders from the Pentagon) and committed
crimes against humanity impossible to either forgive or forget”94.

But Carrera’s most consequential insight is not her disavowal of foreign
intervention in domestic politics, but rather the formulation of the question: “Why does
the North American press give so much space to the findings made by this book?”95
A helpful reply to Carrera’s inquiry involves turning away from political
semantics and directing our gaze towards the people and culture behind it. As a narrative
illustrative of an indigenous, worldly mode of being, Menchú’s narrative is steeped in
ways of understanding lived experience that are culturally different from Western ones.
In order to study different cultures, then, we must study ourselves. To use Spivak’s
phraseology, ‘in other worlds,’ “an investigator has to understand that logic”96 if he is to
understand the culture.97 With this in mind, let us now turn to Menchú’s narrative again,
by paying close attention to how Menchú relates to herself, as evidenced in the things she
says and how she says them. Moreover, we must try to get better acquainted with the
narrative logic she uses in an attempt to bring that logic out of concealment. Likewise, by
retuning our ear for slightly newer and different frequencies we may begin to circumvent
and bypass Stoll’s arguments.
The central argument Stoll levies against Menchú in an effort to impeach her
testimony, keep in mind, is the alleged collectivization of the first person voice—the “I”
that speaks for “all”—as evidenced in the opening lines of I, Rigoberta Menchú: “My
name is Rigoberta Menchú…my story is the story of all poor Guatemalans.”98 This is
because, for Stoll, “the story of one person cannot be the story of everyone….unless in a
non-literal sense.”99 For Menchú, however, the construction of subjectivity—how she
understands and deploys the first-person pronoun, “I”-- is rooted in a communal versus
an individualistic understanding of the self. She writes:
“I can’t force them to understand. Everything, for me, that was the story of my
community is also my own story. I did not come from the air, I am not a little bird who
came alone from the mountains, from parents who were isolated from the world. I am the
product of a community.”100

As evidenced throughout her narrative, Menchú’s understands herself to be the
elected representative and “voice” for her community. When this self-understanding is
compounded with a sense of urgency and instinct towards survival, generalizations such
as speaking for “all poor Guatemalans” occur. It is a dynamic often cited amongst
Holocaust survivors who assert the ‘victims’ of genocide can no longer speak for
themselves because, to be frank, they are dead. Moreover, Menchú carefully emphasizes
at several points in her narrative that she does not speak for everyone, but such instances
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are omitted from Stoll’s book in favor of the single quote “my story is the story of all
poor Guatemalans,” which became the hook and title for his book.
Part of my personal frustration in reading I, Rigoberta Menchú in light of the
controversy sparked by Stoll has to do with how Stoll’s respondents—a small army of
renowned North American scholars and New Left intelligentsia— pounced on Stoll’s
accusations by conceding to his main assertions—that it appears as if yes, in fact,
Menchú actually ‘misconstrued’ or ‘dramatized’ many events— but exculpated Menchú
from any ‘blame’ by offering alternate disciplinary and interpretive frameworks to
explain the uncontested, ‘in-itself’ existence of these discrepancies and contradictions. To
be sure, in the course of analyzing Mench’s narrative, I am also wrapped up in a
particular interpretive framework, whether we choose to call it phenomenological,
postcolonial discourse analysis, or so forth, but the difference lies in that I maintain an
altogether different conclusion about the reasons why Menchú’s narrative, as it is
commonly cited, “failed”. In the wake of Stoll’s claims, the dominant explanatory
positions –such as pointing to the intervention of the ‘editor-compiler’ in any mediated
narrative (Sklodowska); the inadequacies of earlier definitions of testimonio (Beverley
and Zimmerman); the privileging of certain kinds of models of ‘Truth’ in traditional
Journalism versus new journalism (Poniatowska); or as the result of intentional rhetorical
devices aimed at keeping a safe distance from foreigners — all pointed away form the
text, albeit each for wildly different yet expertly-argued reasons. These critiques are not
at all without relevance; in fact, all of these interpretations are immensely helpful in
thinking about testimonial practice and, by relation, about how different societies
construct cultural-ideological apparatuses through contestational networks of power
relations.
However, in my view, to respond to Stoll’s allegations, the ‘explanation,’ if we
may call it that, was always already present throughout her narrative; only it was nested,
peppered rather than overtly bolded in ways hasty readers would not see as ‘evident’.
From this stance, we can make the following counter-arguments regarding Stoll’s
accusations: First, impeaching Menchú’s eye-witness descriptions of the death of her
brothers, which Stoll alleges she never bore “direct” witness too lies in a
misunderstanding (a mis-listening) of what Menchú means—and more importantly, says
she means—by “brother”, which itself is predicated on Stoll’s pre-reflective assumption
that the Western notion of subjectivity and ‘personal identity’ is universal and
uncontested. Furthermore, Menchú’s authority to talk about the death of other Indians is
pre-given in her culture; in fact, due to the explanation of the role her parents play in the
ancestral framework, it is almost her responsibility to speak for others, as will be shown.
Also, the murder of an Indian is experienced significantly different by the Mayans
than the way the concept of murder is understood in the West: “as for killing someone:
death lived by others,” (202) the untimely death of any Mayan, she says, is always
experienced by other people because death can only be “one’s own” if one has been
given a chance to own up to ‘death’ during the traditional Death ceremony. It is only at
that time an Indian can speak ‘as himself’ and make recommendations to the whole
community. The murder of an Indian is thus carried forward by a community as if it were
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one’s own murder, calling it up again and again in denunciations of the murderers since
the murdered Indian was never able to speak as (what in the West is understood as ) one’s
self.
Stoll’s claim that testimonies based on hearsay— that is, testimony based on what
other people saw, said, or experienced— violates the aforementioned conditions for
credibility of a witness (such as describing only experiences one had oneself) entirely
misses what Menchú is trying to say about the nature of ‘giving testimony’—namely, that
it is the product of a communal interpretation versus an individual’s. Specifically, (and
this is perhaps the most noteworthy reversal of Stoll’s reading of Menchú’s narrative) if
we read closely, we can see that hearsay turns out to be a privileged from of knowledge
for Quiche Mayan Indians.
Every one of Stoll’s allegations, such as his contentions that Menchú failed to
mention her schooling, her ability to read, write, and speak Spanish, or even the civic
nature of the land dispute between her father and a neighbor is unfounded as a
“revelation” or “discovery” since Menchú talks about every one of Stoll’s allegations in
her narrative, offering explanations which have fallen on deaf ears. Had a more attuned
reading of the narrative taken place, perhaps Stoll would have abandoned his project,
since it is difficult to “discover” for the first time, calling it groundbreaking news, what
one has already said, hence eliminating the possibility of ‘withholding facts’. Let us
examine.
Menchú succinctly summarizes the Mayan worldview on identity in the last
pages of the book: “my life does not belong to me” (246), she says. But what, precisely,
does one mean by that? Menchú goes to great lengths to give a descriptive account of her
answer:
“the birth of a new member is very significant for the community, as it belongs to
the community not just to the parents, and that’s why three couples must be there to
receive it…the child is the fruit of communal love” (8).

“from the very first day,” tells Menchú, “the baby belongs to the community, not only to
the parents” (15) and for this reason “our customs do not allow single women to see a
birth…it’s a scandal if an Indian woman goes to a hospital and gives birth there” (8). This
is because all the communal representatives are not allowed to be present to receive the
child in a hospital birth-room, thus violating their ceremonial customs. Any child born to
members of the community thus becomes the “brother” or “sister” of other members of
the community: “they were Indians, our brothers” (180), Menchú insists. When traveling
through other communities which, as Menchú observed, shared habitual practices with
the Indians back home (such as sleeping on mats or eating tortilla with chile for
breakfast), “it was as if I were living with my brothers and sisters” (163), she says.
Because her ‘biological’ family, as we understand the category of family to mean, was
clearly not the only family to subscribe to those daily habits, what Menchú signifies by
“brother and sisters” are her communal brothers and sisters. “When, on May 29th, 1978,
the army massacred 106 peasants in the nearby village of Panzós, a community made up
of Keckchi Indians that shared almost identical daily practices, says Menchú, “we felt
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this was a direct attack on us. It was as if they’d murdered us, as if we were being
tortured when they killed those people” (160). “I loved all my people, and for me they’re
all brothers and sisters whoever they are” (243), she repeats. But to recall, her people are
foremost Mayans-- those who share the same habitual practices and customs.
This pre-woven understanding of ‘siblings,’ in part, explains why Menchú seems
to find it difficult to give an actual count, to the best of her abilities, how many “blood”
brothers and sisters she had: “My mother already had five children, I think. Yes, I had
five brothers and sisters and I’m the sixth” (5, emphasis mine). Yet elsewhere she
describes the count differently: “I’m the sixth in the family, with three brothers after me”
(48). The task here is not to cover up any tensions, which, as hybrid identities battling
with the legacy of colonialism within themselves, Mayan identities may have, but rather
to listen to accounts of life that are openly struggling with those very tensions, trying to
place emphasis on how the world shows up for them in light of those tensions. For
example, Menchú gives an account of Indian identity which might mitigate the
appearance of these tensions. Stoll, on the other hand, clasps on to these surface-level
appearances of tensions in order for him to base his claim that Menchú is lying.101 He
does not take into consideration Menchú’s claim that for the Mayans, “a child is not born
into a ‘family’ but rather “he very slowly becomes a member of it ” (10). This usually
happens between by the age of 12; that is when a child is reintroduced into the
community as a member of a particular ‘family’, but remains a brother or sister to all.
To complicate matters, one’s “identity” is not assumed to come with birth;
Mayans grow into it and moreover posses a doubled sense of self. This other ‘self’ is the
nahual : “the nahual is our double” (6), Menchú explains. “Younger children don’t know
the nahual of their elder brothers and sisters” she later expands; “they are only told all
this when they are mature enough and this could be at any age between ten and twelve”
(20). Knowing the ‘identity’ of one’s ‘biological’ brothers and sisters (which is always
tertiary to the communal self and the nahuatl self), then, is something one must be ‘told’,
because it is not pre-supposed in the culture. Consider, then, Menchú’s description of
which brother died of malnutrition: “his name was Nicolás. He died when I was eight. He
was the youngest of all of us, the one my mother used to carry about. He was two then”
(38). Consequently, Menchú is trying to convey that she did not yet know her brother’s
identity according to Mayan understandings of ‘self’. Still, her situation of enunciation
necessitated that she use whatever metric of expressibility she needed to use to relate her
message and impress upon her interlocutor the urgency of her people’s situation— trying
to explain things, for instance, in ways she thought the European ear would understand—
if along the way things were lost in translation, it should not be occasion for impeaching
the testimony of an indigenous plaintiff, not just an ‘informant’.

On this point of giving testimony, Stoll makes much ado about Menchú’s account
not being ‘faithful of the genre it purports to be an example of’—testimonio—because it
is not based on a first-person eye witness account. Yet the construction of ‘testimony’
Stoll is deploying is not of Menchú’s making: for her, ‘testimony’ is a lived phenomenon:
“my mother used to say that through her life, through her living testimony” (199)….a
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‘testimony’ as the Mayans understand it, is therefore the totality of a life; not the
recounting of a single temporal event, a dot in a teleological timeline— no, testimony is
foremost embodied. Thus, for her murdered brothers and sisters, “we have to keep this
grief as a testimony to them” (ibid); it is something felt very personally.
Yet on a more significant point, Mayans use hearsay to legitimize knowledge
claims because through hearsay one invokes the memory of ancestors by calling them
into the present: “if an elderly person tells us this, then it must be true” (123). Growing
up, Menchú’s father “didn’t talk about himself, he’d say: ‘This is what my father did.’
And they knew the whole of our grandparents’ lives like a film” (188). During the
marriage rites, “the grandmother tries to give her granddaughter a general idea of what
she feels about what is happening in the world…they apply past experience to the
present” (76) through talking about their own parents. In turn:
“[my mother] taught me by talking about the experiences of her
grandmother…she didn’t pass on her own experiences, not that she hadn’t had them, but
because she felt more comfortable teaching me through the experiences of others (210)”.

“But , as I said,” Menchú reiterates ,“she usually told me about my grandparents;
not about herself” (211). Hence, when Menchú tries to narrate events she did not witness
directly, she begins by saying: “I’m remembering something I saw, now that I’m
remembering things about other people’s lives” (150)… “I remember my mother’s life”
(88). Without question, the most reproduced of Stoll’s indictments against Menchú’s
testimony is “uncovering” allegations she was not present at the alleged public burning of
her eldest brother, Petrochino, because public burnings never occurred in the region
Menchú alleges the burning took place. The principal reason Stoll’s critics have not
defended Menchú on this specific claim other than by saying she had her own ‘reasons’
for misrepresenting her brother’s death, derives from the excruciatingly explicit account
of the narration:
“[the soldiers] lined up the tortured and poured petrol on them; and then the
soldiers set fire to each one of them. Many of them begged for mercy. Some of them
screamed, many of them leapt but uttered no sound—of course, that was because their
breathing was cut off…” (178).

Upon the publication of Rohter’s article, Menchú admitted she was not there
personally, but her mother was. Because Menchú carries on her mother’s life as a film, a
long hieroglyphic reel she must pass on to her own daughter one day, the “revelation” of
her mother being the first-person eye witness is no revelation at all—it was always
implicit in her narrative:
“I wasn’t there at the time; I was in Huehuetenango when my brother was
captured” (173); “My mother said: ‘My son will be among those who are punished’ It
was going to be done in public, that is, they were calling the people out to witness the
punishment…So my mother said: ‘Come along then, if they’re calling out everyone,
we’ll have to go” (175)…“My mother was just about 100 percent certain her son would
be amongst those being brought in” (176). “My mother went closer to the lorry to see if
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she could recognize her son;” “my mother recognized her son, my little brother, among
them” (176). Menchú continues: “If I remember alright…” from what her mother told her
(177)… “My mother was weeping, she was looking at her son(178);” “my mother said he
scarcely recognized us. Or perhaps…My mother said he did, that he could still smile at
her, but I, well, I didn’t see that”. (179). “My mother was half dead with grief. She
embraced her son, she spoke to him…Then my mother said, ‘I can’t stay here’ So we had
to go, to leave it all behind and leave off looking” (180).“My mother…She couldn’t bear
it, she remembered the whole thing. She cried from moment to moment, remembering
(181). The tension Menchú is faced with lies in trying to telling her story about
communal experiences to an ear she already knows will hear for different things—for an
“I” that is narrating— hence, in trying to resolve the tension by placing herself at the
scene of the crime, Menchú tries to segue back into the familiar way of talking about
lived experience, as in repeating what elders have said beforehand: “My mother told me
that one of my brothers died of intoxication” (88), she divulges.
Knowing the emphasis Western ways of thinking place on first-person narrations
of events, If Menchú were to simply have asked her interlocutor, “why did they spray
poison when people were working there?” (89) without illustrating that Indians have died
as a result of the practice, perhaps Menchú worried her concerns (which are also her
people’s concerns) would have not been heard, again. She says: “her name was Maria.
She was my friend” (87) ; “one day she died of poisoning when they were spraying
cotton” (87). “That friend of mine had left me with many things to think about” (88). But
can the death of her one friend carry the weight it needed to call our attention to the
practice? Menchú reminds us of the following:
“you know, it wasn’t just my brother’s life. It was many lives, and you don’t
think that the grief is just for yourself but for all the relatives of the others; God knows if
they found relatives of theirs there or not! Anyway, they were Indians, our brothers”
(180)

And again:
“It angered me too not to have my older brothers with us, not to know them,
because they’d died of hunger, of malnutrition, of not having enough to eat in the finca”
(ibid).

Regardless of which one of her many Indian brothers died, or of the way they
died, the point is, at the close of day, “they didn’t die because they wanted to” (118). At
other moments, Menchú discloses how she, herself, speaks through hearsay or about a
specific event in a manner other than the expected one: “of course,” in confiding with an
Indian maid in the capital about her problems back home, she says, “I didn’t tell her
about my situation or any of my problems; I told it in a different way, talking about my
experiences in the finca. I found this a relief, there were less things on top of me” (239).
For Menchú, the “truth” of an event can only be constructed when another
member of her community, especially an elder, says an event happened in a certain way.
Knowing the ‘truth’ of the community, she says, “is the main purpose of the elected
leader—to embody all the values handed down from our ancestors. He is the hearer of
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the community, a father to all our children, and he must lead an exemplary life. Above
all, he has a commitment to the whole community” (17); “the leaders then pledge the
support of the community and say…we will be the child’s second parents…they are
known as abuelos,…or ‘forefathers’ (7). Menchú’s right to speak for other people in her
community, she explains in her narrative, hence derives from the crucial fact “my father
was our community’s elected leader, and so was my mother” (187). She continues:
“in our village, my father and mother were the representatives. Well, then the
whole community becomes the children of the woman who’s elected. So, a mother, on her
first day of pregnancy, goes with her husband to tell these elected leaders that she’s going
to have a child, because the child will not only belong to them but to the whole
community” (7)

Menchú frequently reminds her interlocutor that “our people looked on my father
as their own father” (106) and so “I felt responsible for many things ” (49); “I began
taking over my mother’s role too. My mother was the woman who coordinated certain
things in the community” (79). As a result of the role her mother and father played in the
community, she explains, “my community always loved me very much, right from when
I was very little. They’d tell me all their sorrows and their joys, because my family had
been there for a very long time” (87). Because both her mother and father have been
murdered, Menchú invariably inherits the task of her parents to carry on the memory of
their ancestors, not just as any member of the community, but as the one traditionally in
charge for hearing and speaking for the community. In the Mayan world, she is now her
people’s representative and she directs her actions accordingly: “everything we’d do,
we’d do it thinking of others: would they like this? Or wouldn’t they like that?”.
Menchú could not have been more persistent in trying to communicate to us that
her ways are different from ours, she says over and over again, “I’d like to say here, that I
wasn’t the only important one…the whole community was important” (117). The “eye”
of the eye-witness, for Mayans, is at all times the “eye” of the community: “we know that
not just one pair of eyes is watching us, but the eyes of the whole community are on us”
(49). And so the problem of incommensurability does not seem to lie with the projection
of the subaltern message, of their attempts to speak up and communicate, but in the
reception of the communication. Underpinning the space for the possibility of dialogue,
then, there exist the particular conceptual orthodoxies derivative of one’s own culture.
Stoll, for example, is swathed under an Enlightenment model of the self, echoed in the
Cartesian dictum “I think therefore I am,” where one can presumably access universal
structures of existence by turning inwards, into mental categories and states. However, in
the absence of such model, experience can be understood the way the Mayans seem to be
articulating: as a fundamentally non-reductive, non-mentalistic continuum of practices, of
everyday, lived agency. Yet to our detriment, awareness of this difference cannot be
easily cultivated cross-culturally owing to the peripheral status subaltern subjects have
been relegated to in official history; theirs is a faint, small voice, one that echoes deeply
as it trembles.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Small Voice of History: Subalternity and the Latin American
Testimonial Narrative
“I do not know whether this text belongs, purely and properly and strictly
and rigorously speaking, to the space of literature, whether it is a fiction
or a testimony, and above all, to what extent it calls these distinctions into
question or causes them to tremble.”
-- Jacques Derrida,
Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, 26

In order to unveil current neocolonialist strategies aimed at reterritorializing
colonial discourse analysis from the mouths of the multitude, the historically voiceless
(by delegitimizing their access), it is helpful to view the Latin American testimonial
narrative’s attempts to decolonize the resources of expression from the standpoint of
history (as that which determines the conditions for the possibility of expression). In this
manner, by disclosing the historically situated epistemic orthodoxies underpinning the
ennunciative acts of both the testimonialista and her academic interlocutors in the
branches of ethnography, anthropology, literature and politics, it might be possible to
point to conditions which facilitate the emergence of neocolonialist contestations for
power, and examine how this power is meted out through normative systems of
representation.
Furthermore, one may be led to ask, following Nietzsche, what such tendencies
signify when viewed “as a symptom of life”; do they calcify or betray our methodologies
of resistance, justifying the means or perhaps revealing the limitations of any discourse
based on a fundamentally foreign metric of expressibility…this remains a tangential (so
as not to disempower liberational projects based on limited methodologies) question of
subaltern cultural production.
Principally, it is the historical dimension of discursive practices—that is, the
normative ethos within which discursive practices are at all times situated—that provides
the backdrop against which a culture’s resources of expression may be understood and
contextualized. For example, in the West, imparting narrative continuity to one’s life is
of relative ease given the precedence of the European Enlightenment; from it, a certain
model of the human subject as a contemplative, isolated consciousness materializes, one
that supports the interpretation of lived experience as a progressive telos commensurate
with a linear timescape. Continuity becomes possible through the epistemic structures
52

underpinning culture; narrative forms that accommodate these conventions, such as
autobiography and the bildungsroman (a novelistic account of one’s own subjective
development, especially childhood), in turn, became centerpieces in the Western literary
canon. Consequently, since and in many ways owing to the Enlightenment, formalist
reading practices were calcified according to an occidental conception of subjectivity that
begins with the notion of a disengaged subject trying to arrive at objective truths through
mentalistic reflexivity.
Conversely, in Latin America (as well as in the colonized, or so-called
maldeveloped, ‘third’ world) the historical dimensions of discursive practices involve not
just the effects of mentalistic, positivist epistemology but more markedly the lived
consequences of a forced imposition of such standards.
The Latin American critic, John Beverley, in particular, has attempted to
demythologize the historical dimension of autobiography in order to question the efficacy
of the form to describe the experiences of the marginalized, that is, experiences alien to
representation in official history:
“[the] convention of the autobiographical form…is an ideology built on the
notion of a coherent, self-evident, self-conscious, commanding subject who appropriates
literature precisely as a means of ‘self-expression’ and who in turn constructs textually
for the reader the liberal imaginary of a unique, ‘free’, autonomous ego as the natural
form of being and public achievement”.102

In other words, from the standpoint of modernity, it makes sense to talk about
one’s life in the first person and with sequential organization because the
autobiographical form rests on humanist notions already familiar to our understanding of
being. They are already familiar because the history of the West—the grand voice of
History— is also the history of the victors in colonial contestations of power and as such
has become ubiquitous. In the case of Western conceptual orthodoxies that deploy binary
oppositions (which make systems of exclusion possible), the multifarious, pre-colonial
channels of verbalization have been expunged from official history; orality, folktale,
rumor and proverbial knowledge are covered over as possible means of expression.
But to recover what no longer exists, particularly with regard to Amerindian
languages, is not a viable possibility. What does remain a possibility, and an important
one at that, is the ability to diagnose the malady which has continued to malnourish our
perception of our selves, specifically through the apparatus of language. Because
theoretical reflection domesticates expression by organizing it, thematizing along the
grand narratives and essentialized structures of occidental history, becoming aware of this
tendency in our own dealings with subaltern texts will mean resisting tendencies to fall
prey to these conventions—specifically, by deautomatizing our mode of engagement with
subaltern texts, by not using their speech acts, agency, and embodiment as a mirror to
ourselves.
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If, according to Spivak, speaking as a subaltern subject precludes the possibility
of being heard as such (due primarily to a lack of access to the acknowledged system of
representation), then the “auto-referrential self-sufficiency that is the basis of formalist
reading practices” cannot adequately hear/read for voices which fall outside that standard
for discourse.103 Furthermore, if it is the case that “testimony has as its goal the mental,
physical, and spiritual decolonization of the third world”104, then it must be said that to
self-legitimate presupposes a necessary degree of autonomy from the apparatus (be it
state, cultural, or ideological) from which one is attempting to gain autonomy.
Autonomy, from the Greek auto (self) and nomos (custom, law), gains literal expression
as the ability to be a law unto one’s self, as having the quality of independence by living
through self-directive laws.
In the case of Western history, the Law is seen as transcendent rational structures
that fundamentally and inextricably condition discursive practices (insofar as practices
are always predicated by a historical matrix). However, because the monolithic nature of
Western history makes it difficult, if not impossible to self-legitimate from a position of
exteriority—that is, from outside the sedimented structures of Western history, new
discursive models therefore necessitate a new historiography. To this end, given the
constitutive view of language as engenderer of experience, new forms of linguistic
exchange are also needed to support the conventions of a subterranean history surfacing
from the crust of official history. In cases where the official story silences situations of
bondage, repression, and the struggle for survival, the emergence of new discursive
models is not a theoretical commodity, but in many ways a method of survival; thus,
“testimonial writing is foremost an act, a tactic by means of which people engage in the
process of self-constitution and survival”105.
Subaltern histories emerge from a corrective effort, material and intellectual, of the
grand narratives that subsume their existence to the margins, where they cannot be read
for without a magnifying glass, if at all. As a tactic designed to provide emancipatory
access to codified systems of representation by challenging hegemonic interpretations of
history, testimonial literature signifies an attempt to decolonize the resources expression
in a manner advantageous to subjects positioned in historically non-dominant cultures. It
is thus seen primarily as a tool; George Yúdice, for example, notes that
“Testimonial writing…coincides with one of the fundamental tenets of
postmodernity: the rejection of what Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) calls grand or master
narratives, which function to legitimize ‘political or historical teleologies,…or the great
‘actors’ and ‘subjects’ of history—the nation-state, the proletariat, the party, the West,
etc.”106.

If there appears to be a disjuncture between the universal regulatory mechanisms
the institution of Western literature espouses and the phenomenon of testimonial writing,
it is incumbent upon us to examine the justificatory authority of literature to legitimize
the discursive practices of subaltern subjects in situations where literacy and writing have
themselves become uncontested, dominant narratives. By contrast, “as the voice of a
singular subject, testimonio [is] almost by definition a petit récit, or in Ranajit Guha’s
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phrase “the small voice of history”107. It is this small voice, this recalcitrant history, to
which we now turn our attention.

Etymologically, Testimonio, from the Latin testimonium, is derived from testis,
meaning “testes” or, as a secondary (and telling) meaning, “witness” and monium, a
suffix signifying a “state, action” or “condition”. It bears a strong relationship to
testamentum, also Latin, for testament. The latter, a noun, originates from the verbial
forms of testari, “to make a will” (which is also rooted in testis) and facere “to make”
(as in testificari)108. “Testimony” is therefore the publication (in an older sense of oral
vocalization) of an account of events, states, or conditions to which one has borne
witness. The authority to testify is in part derived from the historical position of male
privilege; reliability in witnessing and male virility are synonymously complicit in the
Latin root “testis”, and would be expected in keeping with the relative position of males
in classical society.
The confluence of the legal and religious connotations of testimony, as the term is
used today, however, are not themselves rooted in the original meaning of testimonium,
but rather are abstracted through the subjective structures of abstract (objective) legalism
and Christianity characteristic of the colonial importations of Western systems of
signification. It is a historical event, the conquest of the Americas, which supported this
framework and from which any discussion of testimonio must begin.
As Beverley defines it, testimonio is “ a novel or novella-length narrative in book
form or pamphlet (that is, printed as opposed to acoustic) form, told in the first person by
a narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he or she recounts, and
whose unit of narration is usually a “life” or a significant life experience”.109
This articulation of testimonial literature as a genre, modeled after Miguel Barnet’s
account of the form, has become standard in critical readings of testimonio. It is also a
definition in collusion with Marxist interpretations of discursive strategy, interpretations
which, as teleologically driven accounts of historically determinist material forces, often
overlook more nuanced historical precedents inherent in the form, such as language.
In 1492, a watershed year marking rapid shifts in human relations and
constructions of culture, a University of Salamanca scholar named Antonio Nebrija wrote
a grammatical tract, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, which had widespread
implications for discursive practices in the colonies. As the first systematized
compendium of a romance language, Nebrija’s tract thematized the Castillian language
through rules in usage of expression. In her article, “ Language and Empire: the Vision of
Nebrija” La Rosa effectively argues for the homogenizing aspects of colonial language
policy by examining the imperialist tendencies inherent in Nebrija’s works; to this effect,
she quotes Nebrija’s well-known dictum that “language has always been the perfect
instrument of empire”.110 Castilian, the official language of the Spanish crown and lingua
franca for official business and mercantile relations, was of course, not the only language
operative in Spain; Catalonian, for example, was also predominantly spoken at the time.
However, as the official language, it is the one imported to the colonies as a grammar,
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chiefly for the purposes of consolidating the unification (or should I say, domestication)
process throughout the various, multilingual Amerindian peoples.
In this light, Spanish is the language of Spain, of European empire and is the most
potent, homogenizing facet of conquest. It is the most powerful because it covers over
forms of expression which grew organically alongside experiences Amerindian languages
traditionally sought to represent. As a cultural apparatus, language draws its forms from
the traditional storytelling compositions existent in the cultural matrix of this speaker; if
experience is narrated and understood as fragmentary, discontinuous events, it may for
instance take the form of paratactic structures of signification, as opposed to syntactical
ones. However, when there exists a foreign imposition of normative frameworks, it is
language which houses and transmits those foreign conventions at the level of the
unheard, giving off the false appearance of normalcy and domestic familiarity of those
conventions.
Nonetheless, in lieu of this, subaltern subjects are charged with the task of
deploying the language of the colonizer in anti-colonial struggles. This, perhaps, is one of
the biggest difficulties testimonialistas experience in their discursive attempts, namely,
that language reproduces certain conventions not easily seen by us, and thus creates the
conditions ripe for feelings of frustration, disappointment, and co-optment by
neocolonialsit forces at home with those conventions. It is in the context of this
problematic that the methodological issues and problems surrounding testimonio arise:
the role of the interlocutor, communal multivocality, reliability, contestations of
authenticity, and interpretive authority.
What we can be sure of at the present time is that “more than any other form of
writing in Latin America, the testimonio has contributed to the demise of the traditional
role of the intellectual/artist as spokesperson for the ‘voiceless’”111.
From the standpoint of literature, the conceptualization of a new literary genre
called testimonio in Latin America began officially in the second half of the twentieth
century as discursive attempts to bear witness to the oppression and human rights abuses
enacted by post-colonial reorganizations of government in the form of brutal military and
dictatorial regimes. For example, in the Guatemalan strain, states Zimmerman,
“beyond the chronicles of the Quichés and Cakchicals at the time of the Conquest
and the countless ethnographic accounts over the years, modern testimonio in Guatemala
had its first major stirrings in fictional and autobiographical prose (Wyld Ospina, Arévalo
Marínez, Asutrias, Cardoza y Aragón, Monteforte Teledo, etc.) dealing with the
dictatorships of Manuel Estrada Cabrera and Jorge Ubico; and it had its early apogee with
the accounts of the intervention of 1954, the United States and military maneuverings and
the aftermath involving exile and imprisonment for so many national leaders.”112

Most significantly, it arose out of the many projects of liberation which preceeded
national independence movements in Latin America. But perhaps the most significant
epoch for the prolifieration and advocacy of the form as a genre arose from the
ideological status afforded to it by the consolidators of the Nicaraguan revolution, the
Sandinistas.
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On July 20, 1979, immediately following its ascendancy to power, the new
Sandinist government established a Ministry of Culture with the intent to make
“decolonized” forms of cultural expression not just more visible in the new
administration, but also more accessible to the public at large. Decree number 6 of the
FSLN manifesto articulated a sweeping agenda in the arts under the title “Revolution in
Culture and Education,” which insisted that in order to take back the state which had
oppressed them, Nicaraguans must also take back the culture which supported such a
state. Raul Quintanilla, new director of the National School for the Visual Arts, observes:
“Through the revolution, we earned the right to freedom of expression, and thus
set for ourselves the task of re-appropriating part of the heritage that had been taken from
us throughout 500 years of colonialism as well as neo-colonialism… with this in mind,
we looked in a newly liberated way at the Eurocentric nature of much contemporary art;
we wanted to construct a new visual and poetic language that engaged everyone in
everything”.113

The revolutionary government employed a new kind of socialist pluralism
through a vast national system of Centros Populares de Cultura (national cultural centers
for the people) where Nicaraguan peasants were taught by trained officials how to
express their feelings about the revolution, a changing culture, or about life in general
through “testimonial poetry”. The new cultural centers represented an attempt by the new
government to foster a collective sense of a national identity amongst the rural masses.
Most poignantly, the project was seen and marketed abroad as part of a larger attempt to
democratize culture and the means of producing it through socializing aesthetic
production. This new aesthetic product would be free, according to the Sandinistas, of
“neocolonial penetration.”114
Hence, it was as an oppositional discourse to traditional interpretations of the
postcolonial condition that testimonio first took roots. Subsequent to this, testimonio
attempts to document situations of bondage and oppression, and, although it has its
historical precedence in the chronicles of the conquest it “differs from the traditional
testimonial genre [of the conquest] in its focus on the popular classes and the people
“without history”.115
Originally coined as a term by the ethnologist Miguel Barnet (1969, 1981) in a
“manifesto” format, testimonio was first rigidly defined against a backdrop of
conventionalist epistemic frameworks found most commonly in the natural sciences, that
of realism. Of the many testimonial theorists, most notably González Echevarría (1980),
Casas (1981), Fornet (1977), Foster(1984), Jara and Vidal (1986), and Beverley (1989,
2004) by employing the standards set forth by their respective disciplines of
anthropology, literature, and political science, none were able to construct a definition of
testimonio which would protect the genre from the positivist attacks of David Stoll since
the same epistemology was employed in the original construction of the term: therefore,
it must answer to it or risk contradiction.
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It was only until the Polish theorist and writer Elizabeta Skledowska (1992)
criticized these approaches (specifically she critiques Barnet and Randall) that the
constraining categories surrounding the formal articulation of testimonio began to loosen.
With Lyotard’s notion of the differend in mind (“where a dispute is carried out according
to the terms and language of one of the parties to the dispute)” 116Skledowska unveils
how it is becomes possible under such restrictions to carry out equitable discourse for the
subaltern testimonial subject. If the task at hand is to strip away the corralling standards
of the witness box (appeals to truth) to acknowledge the right of the witness to speak as
the plaintiff, we must also face the fragmentary nature of existence. Specifically, the
critic and interpreter of testimonio must see that “the discourse of a witness cannot be a
reflection of his or her experience, but rather a refraction determined by the vicissitudes
of memory, intention, ideology”117and in so doing acknowledge how it that “a plaintiff is
deprived of the means of arguing and by this fact becomes a victim”118. When seen in this
manner, interpretive practices of testimonial literature themselves reproduce subalternity
by remaining uncritical of the normative epistemic frameworks employed in the process
of interpretation.
To this end, even in a project such as the one undertaken herein, which strives to
clarify some of the methodological difficulties faced by the subaltern speaker in crosscultural communication, it must be said that the conceptual models regulating the
discursive norms of subaltern cultural production are not easily extractable; in order to
speak with urgency, at times, it may be the case that normative language, in some form of
another, is always going to have to be deployed in the effort. However, the distinction lies
on our level of awareness to this fact.
Like the flaps of a manta ray sailing downstream, covering over with its shadow
all that its wingspan can encompass, discursive practices modeled on privileged
conceptual frameworks, although fluid in appearance, end up corralling the speaking
subject inside the auspices of the epistemology in question—inside its shadow. It is a
shadow from which one cannot escape, no salvational light towards which it can crawl,
but whose obfuscating effects can be effectively mitigated through an articulation and
awareness of its existence. Rather than asking “what does it mean for the subaltern
subject to be the producer of knowledge, or can such an act be represented (and if so, by
whom?), the question should be: where does that which is given to the knowing subject
originate, and can those origins account for the epistemic subordination of the postcolonial subject as a producer of knowledge?

Henceforth, the thrust towards a totalizing, rational apprehension of the natural
world, then, can be explained as one wherein “human beings recognize each other by
virtue of being reasonable. The standard of rational deliberation, not that of cross-cultural
recognition, is ultimately what binds together human beings from different cultures”
(Schutte, 1993: 137). However, as earlier stated, rational deliberation can only grasp what
is recognized as rational, as existing. In the case where certain unrecorded histories are in
question, then, what is to become of the subjects absent from the official story? Do they
not find representational form in translation from one culture to another? How do you
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begin to represent someone who is not even acknowledged as existing? And, without
this understanding, how can one create the conditions favorable for them to represent
themselves? You begin by reading for the gaps in the story, the silences. As Edward Said
notes of the history of the Indian masses, those covered over by an official colonial
history,
“subaltern history in literal fact is a narrative missing from the official story of
India…thus we find frequent reference to such things as gaps, absences, lapses,
ellipses, all of them symbolic of the truths that historical writing is after all
writing and not reality, and that as subalterns their history as well as their
historical documents are necessarily in the hands of others” (Said, 1988: vii).

The ‘others’ in question are not so much the colonial administrators but rather the
tools of the colonial administrators: the logic of historiography. Thus, the ‘gap-inknowledge’ now reemerges, but now in the context of contestations of power. In an effort
to consolidate a cohesive rebraiding of a shattered identity (one assigned with value),
since the sixteenth century onwards Latin America has been engaged in a normativized
rebuttal, a reactive dialogue grappling with the legacy and imprint of coloniality. As we,
the progeny of a colonized epistemology, have, generation by generation, slowly ‘grown
into’ this logocentric understanding of our selves and world as a way of making sense of
things, something else has been lost, covered up, concealed. Yes, among the many
consequences which the colonial importation of foreign epistemic and linguistic
frameworks had on Amerindian cultural identity is the creation of an apparent
normalcy…of the inability to articulate suspicions, residual echoes of older
understandings because our current worldview cannot easily accommodate their
contradictory logic, especially if the task at hand is to communicate once again using
colonial narrative logic in order to survive. Everyday and for the most part, whilst
attempting to telegraph urgent conditions of bondage, we abandon other projects, such as
relating subtler states of cultural schizophrenia.
Hence, in order to understand the pedagogical need for a novel approach to the
problem of bridging culturally differentiated epistemic frameworks (especially within
one’s self, to fall on Kristeva’s notion of “the stranger within”), it is vital to adequately
grasp the ways in which Latin American discursive acts are always already situated in a
cross-cultural context, projecting ‘meaning’ through everyday communiqués only insofar
as the intended message is laden with both colonial acculturation to world entities (i.e.
thinking of speech acts reductively as “thought content”) and residual, underground
traces of Amerinidian heritage. The tension between these phenomenon is manifested
largely through a perpetual managing of states of anxiety, frustration, and a sense of
dislocation.
To date, unfortunately, negotiating this tension effectively has come to mean
sublimating the strange, unarticulable suspicion that what is being said is not all one
wishes to say on a matter—just merely what makes sense to say given the tools we’re
pre-given with which to make sense of things. I say unfortunately because rather than
approximate what one means to say, the opportunity of representing one’s self on more
equitable terms is lost, again, by sublimation; by fleeing into comforting metaphysical
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narratives or mimetic stances such as rogue memorization of the ‘correct’ interpretation,
religious conviction, or through deploying a psychology of defensive self-assiduity such
as that taken up by many upper-class meztizo men and women. To say to them they are
not ‘western,’ then, is many times taken up as an implicit suggestion that they are
therefore ‘Indians’—a term which carries derogatory and offensive value in Latin
America. And yet, in light of the claim that Latin American discursive practice begins
from a stance of inequality, there can be no doubt that in the hierarchy of privileged
speaking positions certain Latin American voices are sure to carry more declarative
legitimacy than others (depending on the degree of successful deployments of western
narrative logic…the side one is thought to be perpetually crossing over to), yet even those
declarative stances are themselves circumscribed within the cross-cultural context of
Iberean influence and western cross-pollination.
Speaking from the stance of subalternity, however, entails the inability to
represent oneself due to a lack of access to systems of representation and thus acquiring a
marginal declarative authority. Representing oneself, specifically to Western culture,
then, becomes particularly difficult when the self is a hybrid derivative of an
epistemological cross-pollination and also bears the double burden of a subaltern
speaking position. This double burden is, in part, created by the cultural denigration and
negative value attached to devalued subjects: Indians. For example; while the upper-class
mestiza woman may feel herself culturally superior to her indigenous maid, the mestiza
woman’s situatedness within the ossified matrix of a cross-cultural context will not be
readily evident to her because she does not feel herself different from the culturally
dominant culture responsible for her epistemic oppression, but only from what she
perceives to be the culturally inferior subculture: that of the Indian woman. It is a
comfortable psychological stance which serves a pragmatic function; it etches out a
semblance of an identity based on the negation of others, even though the upper-class
mestiza woman may herself be the negated identity against which North American
women may situate themselves from above. When the mestiza woman, she is neither
against the indigenous Indian woman nor the North American woman, but herself; in
engaging in an antagonistic relation (for and against), the mestiza woman is perpetually
tied to the binary system of representation which foils her identity from achieving selfconstancy.
In the context of intercultural communication, then, these ‘internal’ collisions
appear, to the unifixed ear of western culture, as ‘contradictions’ in the Latina’s
discursive attempts: as a seemingly entrenched inability to be, as it were, reasonable. It
must be maintained, however, that this contradiction is not sui generis, ungrounded in
historicity, or subjective; no, it is the result of the inequitable and unjustified imposition
of culturally dominant world views onto peripheral cultures in the world stage. And,
since practices of imposition are meted out by manifestations of power, it becomes
necessary to “unveil the operative conditions of power that ceaselessly intervene in the
representation and dissemination of communication” (Natter et al., 1995: 7). If it is the
case that “Latin America has not participated in decolonization” (Spivak, 1993: 57), a
startling claim in light of flurried activity of various alleged projects of epistemic and
cultural decolonization which followed movements of independence-- we must take heed.
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Unless the multidimensional nature of the exchange between culturally
differentiated subjects is adequately acknowledged, attempts at intercultural
communication will result in contradiction because Latin American discursivity is itself
coming from a stance of contradiction. And, because cross-cultural communication has
often come to mean, in the West, coming over to one’s side (the side of the victors in
colonial history), intercultural communication has hereto been more a project of
translation for the culturally dominant culture and, conversely, one of mimetic
performance on the part of the recessive, colonized culture. If the representational model
of agency is underpinned by a dichotomous representability/ unrepresentability
distinction, and if “the problem is not just to represent [the subaltern subject] but to create
conditions that would enable it to represent itself”, out of two possible choices, a third
way is needed (Coronil, 2004: 237). It is in part the failure of traditional models of
critiquing intercultural communication, ways which deploy dualistic systems of binaries
(such as truth/falsity, cohate/inchoate, meaningful/meaningless) which now necessitate
angiogenesis: the growth of altogether new bloodlines, new ways of (un)learning to pay
attention—to let attention happen.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Hearing (for) the World of the Other: A Response to the Problem of
Cross-Cultural Communication
“What does it mean for an ear (be) open?”
--Jacques Derrida, Heidegger’s Ear

Leaping out from the starting gate, our guiding question since the beginning of
this thesis has been “can the subaltern speak,” as illustrated through a close analysis of
the subaltern narrative, I, Rigoberta Menchú. In that careful reading, a response emerged
synonymous with Spivak’s way of appending her own question; namely, that no, “the
Indian can’t speak up for what he wants” (103). As subaltern, the Indian can only speak
by becoming not-Indian; by giving up, whether by exhaustively surrendering or violent
extraction, Indian practices and cultural habits. What’s more, their last bastion of
résistance, their language, cannot adequately signify what one means to say when forced
to speak through a foreign metric of expressibility; that is to say, through the discursive
mechanisms of a non-Indian culture. Rather than “genuine” dialogue, incommensurability
is what emerges from cross-cultural communication attempts.
Throughout the project I also operated under what in literary circles is known as a
reader-oriented theory of interpretation. The distinction is this: “while literary criticism is
equally concerned with making ‘meaning’, the focus is generally more on extracting
meaning from the text rather than making explicit the process by which readers, or the
critic, make meaning,”119. Naturally, to prove my point, I could not have started out on
the basis of this theory, for whereas we commenced by taking a magnifying glass to our
subject of study— the “small voice” of subaltern history and discursivity, what we found
on the other side of that glass—was a mirror. Yet this had to be brought out of
concealment through an active process rather than assumed from the beginning, because,
above all, my approach to reading is never fixed, finished, but remains open-ended: as a
method, there is no right destination. Yet at this point of our project we can confidently
address this finding (of treating the other as mirrors to ourselves) by rephrasing the
question “can the subaltern speak” into “can the hegemonic ear hear anything” other than
the frequencies it already recognizes as recognizable frequencies?
In effect, this shifts the object of study from the voice of the subaltern to how
readers/ listeners constitute meaning in linguistic transactions. Because theoretical
reflection, as we have seen, domesticates expression in the very act of reflection, gazing
upon the subaltern voice in an effort to extract meaning from it is tantamount to resilencing it; it obfuscates the ways in which the voice of the subaltern can be raised to the
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level of the explicit by covering up the act of letting something happen to you, by letting
meaning emerge on its own. This requires a certain level of releasement, of letting go on
the part of the listener so that one can hear for the first time frequencies that were always
previously present, but for which our maltuned ears were unequipped. Nothing is more
difficult to hear, after all, than dissonance. Nietzsche reminds us:
“hearing something new is embarrassing and difficult for the ear; foreign music
we do not hear well. When we hear another language we try involuntarily to form the
sounds we hear into words that sound more familiar and more like home to us.” 120

But, as we have seen through our reading of I, Rigoberta Menchú, we can also
‘hear,’ metaphorically speaking, through our eyes:
“Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a given stimulus by reproducing
once more an image that it has produced many times before, instead of registering what is
different and new in an impression. The latter would require more strength…”121

“To understand one another,” then, as Nietzsche says, “it is not enough that one
use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner
experiences; in the end one has to have one’s experience in common” 122. For Menchú,
as for Nietzsche, knowledge is experiential: “we learned all this by watching what has
happened in our lives” (134), by paying very careful attention to the lived world. The
gap between the subaltern speaker and the Western interlocutor thus widens immensely
when one presumes to be able to understand the Other’s situation without actually
having to live it. This is why Menchú, who reserves the term “friend” for a very
selective number of foreigners or Ladinos, lauds so much admiration to an upper-class
academic who taught Menchú how to write and speak Spanish:
“He was someone who’d been able to study, who had a profession and
everything…He preferred to help the CUC rather than become a member because he
said: ‘I don’t deserve to be called peasant. I’m an intellectual.’ He recognized his
inability to do or know many things that peasants know, or the things poor people know.
He said: ‘I can’t talk about hunger the way a peasant can”(166).

By contrast, those who assume to be able to know the other, to be able to translate
what the subaltern means to say through the violence of translation, do not recognize
their stance as distancing—as polarizing rather than magnetic. As a child, Menchú recalls
this bias when trying to speak to Belgian nuns: “The nun didn’t notice, she went on
talking. She was foreign, she wasn’t Guatemalan” (119). The point here is this: if one
were to (hypothetically speaking) successfully ‘cross-over’ into the normative framework
of the foreign speaker simply through learning the foreigner’s language, this would not
ensure meaning is achieved, for in learning a new language one learns what is previously
unconcealed for learning, what shows up as knowledge, language, vocabulary, and norms
to learn. In actuality, the operative norms of a culture may very well be learned only
through slowly growing into the culture, as Menchú contends. To recall, a child born to
the natural world is not just born into the world of the community: “he very slowly
becomes a member of it” (10). Trying to understand a foreign culture by assuming it
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fundamentally converges with what we take all humans to be—to share as universal
attributes—is perhaps a prejudice of an atomistic worldview that reduces lived human
experience to physical states. The atomistic worldview does not account for collapses in
meaning, nor of what it means to be human outside of its own, limited construction of
being; this is because, after all, like the ubiquity of humanism, it has prevailed in the
current historical equation. Menchú, by contrast, is more candid about recognizing the
discordance produced by experiencing foreign cultures, which for her means
encountering not ideas, but what a foreign culture uses everyday. She says:
“When we reached the capital, I saw cars for the first time. I thought they were
animals just going along…when I went to the city for the first time, I saw it as a monster,
as something alien, different…those houses, I thought, ‘this is the world of the ladinos”
(25, 28).

Yet the Ladinos, in popular Western understanding, are Guatemalans; little if no
differentiation is often made between rural and urban Guatemalans, between Indians and
Ladinos. Yet “for me it was the world of the ladinos. We were different” (32). What
happens, then, when one is forcibly thrust into that world, whether through a language or
physically? To fend off conditions of starvation at home, Menchú, at thirteen, left her
community to work as a maid in the capital, Guatemala City:
“My time working as a maid [in the capital]…made me very confused. Yes, I
was very confused. I went through a sort of painful change within myself. It wasn’t so
difficult for the rest of them at home to understand what was real and what was false. But
I found it very hard” (122).

The result of this experience on Menchú’s sense of orientation in life is painfully
frank: “I was very ashamed at being so confused,” (121) she tells us. Yet rather than
“respond to [the] stimulus by reproducing once more an image that it has produced many
times before,” as Nietzsche so poignantly put it, Menchú does not flee the anxiety and
confusion this experience provoked (by concealing its effect on her) but rather tries to
confront it as the painful experience that it is. She does this by trying to carefully
describe it.
In The Postcolonial Critic, to frame the operation of the writing of the colony,
Spivak explains how the determination of colony takes place through workday
activities— the civilizing mission of the “worlding of the worlds”— based on a reading
of Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art”.123 She writes:
[The colonial administrator is] “actually engaged in consolidating the Self of
Europe by obliging the native to cathect the space of the Other on his home ground… He
is worlding their own world. 124

Writing the colony through official colonial history, Spivak tells us, became
possible only by colonizing the workday activities, the everyday tasks of living. This
became possible through the importations, as noted in the historical introduction to our
second chapter, of the homogenizing mechanisms of colonial language, religion, and
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politics as applied to daily activities. It is through the colonization of the workday that
the grafting of particular worldviews onto foreign scaffolding in such a way as to cover
over this very action—to conceal the imposition through an apparent normalcy—was
made possible. This is why, after repeating her workday activities (however exploitative)
on a routine basis, and by living in the city, “when I was older,” she tells us, “I didn’t find
it strange any more” (25). In light of this, I view language in the same role as workday
activities because it is an every-present, continual tool which itself constitutes meaning.
This is partly what I take the expression “decolonizing the resources of expression” to
mean for the subaltern Speaker—that speaking in the wake of the colonial encounter
always entails a prior undertaking of unspeaking the colonialist representation of Speech
proper, yet in so doing risk loosing the practical instrument, however inadequate, through
which one can be legitimately heard at all— as, for example, in learning Spanish and its
syntactical conventions versus other native languages (and in Guatemala, there are
twenty-four indigenous languages).
But to go back to a reader-oriented theory, the task of helping decolonize the
resources of expression also falls on the listeners in a linguistic exchange, not just the
speakers: in the postcolonial era, we ought try and read a history as that which is not
necessarily written in the text, but though which the text is written. It is the sociohistorical background we’ve placed so much emphasis on throughout this thesis. As Leo
Stauss demonstrates in his powerful book, Persecution and the Art of Writing, throughout
modern history even the authors of Western philosophical texts have had to write in
Morse codes to avoid persecution, censorship, or death. It is no coincidence, he points
out, that Descartes had to write from inside a cold, candle-lit cave. In light of this, Strauss
argues, a different way of reading texts is needed, one that scans not the lines but between
the lines. The narrative that emerges from I, Rigoberta Menchú, then, has less to do with
what she said but with what she couldn’t say. By staying aware of the tremendous
difficulty Menchú faced in speaking (by virtue of the marginalized nature of her situation
of enunciation), and by knowing my role as accomplice in making this difficulty possible
through conventional reading practices, this is how the narrative emerged for me:
“When my mother needed help to bury my brother, we couldn’t talk to anyone,
we couldn’t communicate, and she was desolate at the sight of my brother’s body. I
remember only being able to communicate with the others through signs. Most of time
we have had the same experiences; every day we’re stuck in situations in which we can’t
call on help from outside”…“I had a lot of ideas but I knew I couldn’t express them
all”…“The lawyer was a ladino and didn’t understand our language, so we had to get an
intermediary to interpret for him. From the beginning the landowners paid the interpreters
not to say what we said” … “that’s when I told myself: ‘I must learn to speak Spanish, so
that we don’t need intermediaries”…“The ladino has many ways of making his voice
heard…he doesn’t need an intermediary. He has more channels of access” … “the most
distressing thing for us was not being able to speak”.

And so, “if definitions of testimonio are indeed symptomatic of what we look for
when we read with testimonio-seeing eyes,”125 it is incumbent upon us to try to see/hear
differently, not by seeing with altogether different eyes (since to remember, the
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hermeneutic situation is inescapable), but by destabilizing the assumption that ours is
the only way of seeing, the only way that matters. The conventionalism of our reading
practices today are perhaps best described by Nietzsche. He writes:
“Just as little as a reader today reads all of the individual words (let alone
syllables) on a page—rather he picks about five words at random out of twenty and
“guesses” at the meaning that probably belongs to these five words—just as little do we
see a tree exactly and completely with reference to leaves, twigs, color, and form; it is
so much easier for us to simply improvise some approximation of a tree. Even in the
midst of the strangest experiences we still do the same: we make up the major part of the
experience and can scarcely be forced not to contemplate some event s its “inventors”.126

We can now see how Stoll’s own way of seeing, of reading Menchú, in its
listening for his own world, covers over how it is he’s already constructing a misbegotten
picture of Menchu’s world. This is why I choose to call his reading of Menchú neocolonialist, because it re-inscribes the methods by which indigenous worldviews became
deligitimized through (mis) appropriation. Stoll’s book makes sense only within an
interpretive framework based on positivist notions of the existence of “truth”, of an errorfree position capable of achieving something like a ‘correct’ interpretation of worldviews, however different from one’s own. To remember, as a metaphysical scheme, it is
a god’s eye view, a view from nowhere that gives the signifier a sense of having
justificatory authority to signify, because it claims to be neutral, ‘objective’. It is in this
sense, “instrumentalizing”.
Yet to recall our first chapter, the interpretive reflex underpinning the possibility
for intelligibility and understanding of other cultures is itself culturally and historically
conditioned. That is to say, with regard to Stoll’s viewpoint, the way in which he
reappropriates Menchú’s discourse within a positivist scaffolding lends itself to scrutiny
because it is a historical bias he himself fails to see or acknowledge. Yes, naturalistic
thinking is ‘what one does’, the set of instructions one follows, when brought up into a
specific Western understanding of the world which privileges a logocentric account of
being, yet the logocentric account is not the only account of being in the world, and it is
in this sense of the word, perspectival. Since this hermeneutic prejudice is inescapable, it
is a limitation when it is not acknowledged, but also a site for the possibility of dialogue
when it is. When deployed as a monologic, ubiquitous perspective swathed over the
speaking practices of different cultures, logocentric, naturalistic frameworks become
instrumentalizing. This quality of Western communicative practice subverts crosscultural communication because, by virtue of its reappropriative practices, it holds all the
cards on one side the way religious fundamentalisms hold ‘truth’ on theirs; with the
essential nature of god as infallible, believers close themselves off to the possibility of
engaging with nonbelievers, who, by definition, can never be right. Nonbelievers can
come to represent themselves only at the moment they speak the language of the
godhead. Thus dialogue between them is perpetually stillborn. Correspondingly, under
the auspices of “Science” proper, whichever side of a dispute can claim adherence to the
one true faith of neutral objectivity, wins. What is at stake to be won is of great
importance: the ability to be heard.
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What is gained from this exchange seems at first to be the justificatory authority
to legislate and define the essential nature of the empirical world as that which remains
constant through change, is knowable by minds, intelligible in its predictability, and to
which we can attribute discernable properties and patterns. Life becomes controllable.
When the scientific subject encounters uncontrollable situations, volcanic conditions
which force the human eye to venture “and how?”—how is this scenario possible? How
could such carnage and human frailty stem from our enlightened era? The question
therefore mutates into: how can I rescue the fundamental tenets of my faith in humanism,
progress, and modernity? And moreover, how can I save myself in this equation, in these
times of uncertainty and transmutation? As Nietzsche tells us, “the values of a human
begin betray something of the structure of his soul and where it finds its conditions of
life, its true need”.127 Objective, foundational truth, in this sense, is perhaps another
immortality scheme produced from the seduction of timelessness, a freedom from the
contingencies of lived experience, of which suffering is a part. Menchú’s worldview,
rather than flee from contingency, embraces it: “if we didn’t suffer, perhaps we wouldn’t
think of this as life,” she says, for there would be no points of resistance, no struggles
definitive of lived experience (193).
The detached, spectator attitude of the contemplative scientist thus tries to analyze
his way into an answer rather than let the gravity of the questions seep into him; analytic
‘looking into’ is thus a looking away, an attempt to conceal the existence of interpretive
monopolies through the internecine insistence on the universality of foundational
narratives. It must be the case universals exist, otherwise, mastery over the world falls
away.
And who could bear that burden, of asking themselves: how could a quarter of a
million Indians be dead from a war we started? A war ushered in by Empire, by
colonialism, by indifference to any way of life different from our own? Subaltern
histories implicate Stoll in this equation. Perhaps this is why he so firmly heralds and
upholds the right of the rational voice to prevail, for it’s the one voice that can say: what
we did was justifiable, a way of life was at stake, capitalism had to persevere—the red
threat of communism was met with justifiable force… even if communists only wanted
“land reform,” surely it would have been a matter of time before their viewpoint crept
into our borders, uprooting our everyday practices: Arbenz had to go.
Only it was not only Arbenz, or Allende, or even Guevara. It was the historical
infiltration and displacements of self-referential practices in the Americas by Empire; it
was the loss of the right to self-govern, the right to self-legislate, which became
characteristic of the postcolonial condition as seen in the Subaltern’s inability to be heard
on their own terms. Moreover, official history, as exemplified in the document coffers of
the Central Intelligence Agency, does not record accuracy, historical fidelity, but
justifications; instrumental rationales for the stances we take according to the
perspectives our interpretative possibilities will buttress. CIA documents therefore can
only tell us why we did what we did by giving explanations, ironically concealing that we
did it. We need not answer to our actions as a nation since an answer already exists, in the
Orwellian language of bureaucracy stitching official memorandums together.
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Hence, in the spectator attitude that is so detrimental to communicating with
Others, we treat the Other as a mirror because we cannot bear to look at the alternative of
staring elsewhere than at ourselves, to the perhaps uncanny contingencies and struggles
threading through a “less developed” world. This is why theoretical attitudes have a
predilection for being deployed from more developed, “first” world countries; because
the appearance of stability has been most successfully sold and cultivated there. In turn,
positivist research methodologies displace more heuristic methods of describing
phenomena insofar as flux cannot be accommodated by rule-following, by insistence on
accuracy.
When flux, which is always laden in the human condition, comes into the
foreground of existence by way of violent eruptions in history, by profound
destabilization of cultural practice à la the colonial encounter, communiqués can no
longer be sent, shouted, or written across borders: they must be smuggled. The disparity
in the originating equality of speaking positions between subaltern narrators and Western
interpreter/interlocutors hence necessitates a strategy of speaking which may involve
saying just what the Western ear is believed capable of hearing, what it will selectively
reach for. This is not to be taken as “manipulative” on the part of subaltern subjects, but
rather the product of a long historical shift in indigenous systems of signification, from
Mayan hieroglyphic codices to the linear subject-predicate grammar of chirographic
cultures.
Hence, in order to delegitimize entry into official discourse, as Mary Louise Pratt
argues, Stoll deploys a reactive stance commended with the task of resituating Western
ways of understanding at the center of discourse again. The mushrooming of
neocolonialist tendencies in social sciences, therefore, evidence the historical emergence
of contestational forces seeking to displace occidental hegemonic narratives such as
naturalism towards the margins of a new history … “all of which suggests, perhaps, a
testimonial reading of Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans, as the
personal account of the trajectory of a partisan subject whose people are undergoing a
painful historical transition.”128
Yet to recall, the existence of socially and historically situated interpretive
frameworks within cultures are not the only structural determinants of narratological
practices; it is also the collapse of those frameworks which influence how one says what
one says. To this end, embroilment in volatile material conditions (such as war, armed
struggle, or personal tragedy)—that is, being thrust into a matrix of unstable relations
where the preservation of life is the driving force of all action—will fundamentally affect
how a story gets told, what shows up or lights up with emphasis. What methodologies are
employed in the undertaking also depends largely on concomitant aide from the graspable
resources of memory… from what is left of those un-grounding experiences that the
nervous system has not yet refilled in unverbalizable form and labeled under
incommensurable, lived understanding. Sometimes, it is enough to know one has lived
though something to challenge even the most historically trustworthy account to the
contrary. What naturalism fails to account for, then, is the veritable ways in which human
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beings experience a loss in meaning, a collapse in traditional points of reference-- some
by grasping for the limited resources of language to verbalize the unnamable, others by
responding to limit conditions through violent transgressions of normative scaffoldings.
The subaltern speaker is always caught between these two stances--convention and
transgression—between “anxiety” and the creative acclamation of cultures to seismic
conditions.
And so, to survive, one makes do with what is within reach: If to communicate
lived understanding to other cultures, especially under urgent material conditions, one is
given a set of criteria to follow under the rubric of ‘language,’ one is consequently
deprived of one’s own customary means of deploying that language, of the patterns
distinctive to one’s own culture or memory of culture. The text thus becomes not a
reflection of the self but of what the self must do in order to be recognized as a self by
readers of social texts. Texts, as in words, as in grammar, detemporalize the lived
understanding of suffering through translation into stable networks of signification. The
psychodynamics of linear storytelling and the regulatory structuring of expression by
cultural norms do violence to subaltern voices by imposing the interiorization of an
already-privileged metric of exchange in discourse.
This is the hydra-headed nature of suffering. It is a dialogical struggle between
what the self, in all its social and collective enfleshment, has borne witness to, and the
ineffectual resources of social language to encapsulate that which resists
disentanglement-- repackaging for public consumption. ‘It is tragedy, and it is mine’,
feels the victim, yet not without simultaneously wishing to verbalize experience, where
verbalization constitutes a social system of representation, a codeword for access into
political matrixes and where the language of ‘social change’ is meted out between parties
internal to the discourse.
And so then, in response to this struggle of incommensurability, reading
Rigoberta Menchú in context means coming to grips with a pre-woven social and
historical scaffolding from which the text emerges. As difficult an endeavor as this may
be (since it cannot be adduced from simple readings of official accounts but from careful
readings), it is important since history is what lets context be: it lets meaning emerge in
particular ways to particular cultures. Because, as we go ‘forward’ we also carry with us
our past, at the present moment it would be wise to return to where we first sat out from,
from the proscriptions articulated as a response to the problem of cross-cultural
communication: I said:
“And so, letting be, on this view, entails more than a type of “imaginative
identification” with the Other. It requires an applied phenomenology to the
practice of reading and to our own understanding of what a text is. Principally, we
must understand what Spivak meant, following Heidegger, by “the worlding of
worlds” that makes (im)possible genuine cross-cultural communication. In so
doing, our goal then ought to be to hearken for, to hear how it is the Other relates
to herself by rethinking (and this is one way among many) our current
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understanding of narratology, not in terms of a static structure, but in terms of a dynamic
event or happening”.
Learning to let be is thus a precondition for creating openings favorable to
equitable dialogue, since, as Menchú reminds us, “if [two people] don’t discuss things
they can’t understand” (216). The momentous occasion Menchú’s narrative provides lies
in its describing in explicit detail how she relates to herself and others – not by what she
thinks, but by what she does in her every day life. It would be a great loss if we, due to
the stubborn unifixity of our ears, missed such an opportunity…an opportunity to set out
on the way to dialogue with other cultures. As Menchú teaches us, “any element in
nature can change man when he is ready for change” (135). Becoming ready for change
is thus a late-coming, yet not altogether ancillary theme of this thesis; it has—to prove
our point of learning to hear for the unsaid of the Said— been implicitly foretold in the
negative critiques of Stoll’s calcified position, a stance in which Reason proper is the real
interlocutor, not Stoll in the way he understands himself to be the interlocutor of
Menchú’s discursive attempts. Opening up to other possibilities, other perspectives, will
therefore require letting go, relinquishing a belief in the controllable nature of existence,
of the many narratives and schemes we device to overcome the limitations of time, of
flux.
In closing, learning to hear for the unsaid that is at all times nested in the Said,
through a careful attunement which brings the unsaid out of concealment, is the guiding
claim of this thesis. It is thus the method I deploy when reading texts such as I, Rigoberta
Menchú; one that is without question mediated through my own way of understanding
her, or what it means to be unable to speak. Yet it is a method I believe most helpfully
deautomatizes our everyday engagement with the text, engagements that through their
normative portent, can be instrumentalizing.
Fittingly, then, the last word belongs to Menchú, from whom—until the day I can
eat what she eats, weave, dance, weep, or speak as she speaks—I’ve yet to earn the right
to call, Rigoberta:
And “so, you see, it’s a different world”… “of course, I need a lot of time to tell
you all about my people, because it’s not easy to understand just like that. And I think
I’ve given some idea of that in my account” (57, 247).
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NOTES

1

The phrace ‘subaltern’ was first used by Antonio Gramsci in the “notes on Italian History” of
his Prison Notebooks. There, he deployed the term as a stand-in for “proletariat” to escape
prison censors; it also served to designate the class of peasants in southern Italy unintegrated
by the bourgeois-led resorgimento (see, for example, Beverley, 1999: 11-13). Subsequently,
the term has been used in different manners by critics in the fields of history, politics,
anthropology, and cultural studies, to name a few. The most well-developed uses of the term,
however, are those of Gayatri Spivka, Homi Bhabha, and Ranajit Guha—funding members of
what has come to be known as the Subaltern Studies group. Guha sees the term “as a general
attribute for subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class,
caste, gender, or any other way” (Selected Subaltern Studies Reader, 1988: 43). Yet “for
Spivak the subaltern is that which always slides under or away from representation…because
simply by merging into representation…it looses the character of Subalternity”; she is
concerned, moreover, “with the way in which elite representation effaces the effective
presence of the subaltern” (Beverley, 1999: 101- 104).
2
Due to historical (in)accessibility to systems of representation, my preference for using “she”
derives, foremost, as an example of the need to de-automatize our unreflective practices and
biases such as deploying “he” to signify both genders; it is a bias further sedimented by the
conceptual model of Renaissance humanism and the leveling egalitarian tradition of the
European Enlightenment.
3
See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1964.
4
See Weber, Protestant Ethic, 1958.
5
Spivak’s essay has three versions; the first, which appeared in a 1985 edition of the journal
Wedge, a second, more developed version which appeared in the 1988 volume of Marxism and
the Interpretation of Culture, and finally, a vastly expanded (100 page plus) version in
Spivaks’s 1999 publication of A Critique of Postcolonial Reason.
6
For a candid discussion on the (mis)interpretation of Spivak’s two most prominent ideas—
strategic essentialism and the (im)possibility of Subaltern discursivity, see Jenny Sharpe’s
interview of her mentor, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society, volume 28 (2003), pages 609–624.
7
Spivak, 1988, p. 300.
8
One reason the Western interlocutor is more likely to place his discourse at the center (rather
than see it as a perspective) is that Colonial subjects, and most powerfully indigenous
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(subaltern) subjects have a powerful reminder of the existence of a different perspective in
colonization.
9
As quoted in Hartman, 1999, p. 347.
10
Although it is not made explicit in this chapter, for Schutte, the “principle of (cross-cultural)
incommensurability” signifies an “attempt to designate the lack of complete translatability of
various expressions or blocks of meaning between two or more linguistic-cultural symbolic
systems” and “may also refer to incommensurable ways of thinking insofar as the differences
are culturally determined” (cf. note 12). My use of the term alludes to this concept, albeit in a
way that emphasizes both the event of having (mis)understood subaltern discursive attempts
and the pre-woven, historical sediment which gives rise to conditions for the possibility of
such events.
11
Guha, 1988: 44.
12
I owe the use of the term “culturally asymmetrical position” to Schutte, 1988: 54.
13
On March 10, 1999, during the Central American Summit held in Guatemala that year, Clinton
gave the following remarks in response to a Guatemalan dignitary who brought up the issue of
North American accountability for the ‘internal’ war in Guatemala: “For the United States it is
important I state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units, which engaged
in violence and widespread repression was wrong. And the United States must not repeat that
mistake…During the Cold War, when we were so concerned about being in competition with
the Soviet Union, very often we dealt with countries in African and in other parts of the world
based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
than how they stood in the struggle for their own people’s aspirations to live up to the fullest
of their God-given abilities…I am making great efforts to change our historical relations with
Central America” (as qtd. in Lane, 1999: 8). This was the first time a sitting president had
publicly conceded to a foreign country about being on “the wrong side” of a political and
social struggle.
14
See Lutz. 2001: 60-89.
15
Ibid.
16
The peace accords signaled an “official” cessation to the violence. In reality, however, Indian
removal politics continue, albeit in a less intense manner than a decade earlier, throughout
Guatemala. Lutz (2001) details the continuation of human rights abuses and the struggle of
Guatemala’s Indigenous population.
17
See Said, 1979.
18
Beverley, 2004: 11.
19
In the introduction to Gugelberger’s 1996 The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse and Latin
America, an anthology of critical essay’s on testimonio, Gugelberger describes the genre as “a
moment that has passed,” suggesting a type of conventionalism has reemerged in the
disciplinary juncture of literature and politics. In 1999, in the wake of Stoll’s allegations
against Menchú, the critical literature that emerged in response to the controversy (which
sought to defend Menchú) underplayed the hereto canonical status of Gugelberger’s
anthology, which itself was emblematic of critical trends towards seeing testimonio as a spinoff of “postmodernist play” (see Gorge Yudice, 1995, for example).
20
Guha, 1988: vii.
21
Burgos-Debray and Rigoberta Menchú, 1983: preface.
22
See Arias, The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy, 2001.
23
The texts which did exits on testimonial practice (as in “giving one’s testimony”), such as
C.A.S. Coady’s Testimony: A Philosophical Study stayed at the level of abstraction, that is,
without social or historical contexts.
24
Pratt, Mary Louse. “I, Rigoberta Menchú and the Culture Wars.” The Rigoberta Menchú
Controversy, ed. Arturo Arias. 2001: 29-30. (Henceforth RMC)
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25

Lyotard, 1988: 24.
Narratology in the study of theories of narratives, particularly with regard to its structures and
conventions. For this project, I am using the term generally in way, though many takes exist
which differ significantly from one another. See, For example, Jahn, Manfred.. Narratology:
A Guide to the Theory of Narrative. University of Cologne Press, 2005.
27
This concept is not formulated to endorse the existence of a single ‘shared metric’ akin to
Habbermas’ construction of what he calls communicative rationality. The reservation lies in
that the ‘assigned’ nature of such a metric can itself produce oppressive qualities by
subjugating all discussants to the totality of one monolithic standard.
28
An interesting question, one that cannot be adjudicated in the limited scope of this thesis, but is
nonetheless of value to our metacritical project, is whether one could strategically induce
conditions for breakdown for the purposes of deautomatizing our familiar everydayness with
cultural presuppositions, thereby creating an opening in the conceptual framework corralling
cross-cultural incommensurability. The problem would be twofold; first, such a notion could
lead to unjustifiable acts of terrorism, and secondly, the very notion of replicating rupture
would, in time, neutralize the destabilizing power of difference by normativizing the
occurrence; in other words, it would become just another form of expression.
29
As quoted in Carmack, 1988: 164.
30
Castaneda, 2002: 23.
31
Ibid, 24.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid, 25.
34
As qtd. in Carmack, 1988: 167.
35
Schutte, 1998: 54.
36
Guha, 1988: 47.
37
This Bridge Called My Back, edited C. Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua. Watertown, MA:
Persephone. 1981.
38
Carmack, 169, emphasis mine.
39
Schutte, 1988: 55.
40
William Luis has recently called attention to the socio-historical circumstances under which
Barnett first theorized testimonio as a way to problematize the concretized nature of the genre.
According to Luis, Barnett, whose artistic aspirations lay in poetry, not theory, drew on his
day-trade as an Ethnologist to conceptualize testimonial literature in the wake of government
censorship. Prior to writing his Autobiography of a Runaway Slave, Barnet had only written
two books, both of poetry. William explains: “Barnet was associated with the second
generation group of poets known as El Puente, named after a private publishing house of the
same name which operated between 1960-65. In 1964, El Puente published [Barnet’s] second
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